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MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT LINKS: CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION AND CRITICISMS IN ANHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

The current relationship between migration and development has rightly been characterized as "unsettled" (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991). Since the publication of the influential Ascencio report, a new consensus has arisen that rather than stemming or containing migration pressure, development can stimulate migration in the short term by raising people's expectations and by enhancing the resources that are needed to move (Ascencio, 1990; see also OECD, 1992; IOM, 1996). Some of the work known as the "new economics of migration" suggests that the demand for remittances from migrants, for example, increases as development proceeds and both investment opportunities and returns on investment increase. Thus, by enhancing development, remittances may therefore propel or perpetuate migration. Put another way, there is a "migration hump" (Martin, 1997; Martin and Taylor, 2001; Martin and Widgren, 2001) that must be overcome before people are encouraged to stay, put by the development of their homelands and migration begins to decline. Accompanying this view, models of migration based on economic forces such as pull and push factors have been supplemented by approaches recognizing mediating factors such as social networks, improved communication and transportation linkages, trade competition between countries, government migration policies, and violent conflicts within countries, yielding a more dynamic analysis of how migrations begin, how and why they stop or continue, and the extent to which migration can be controlled.

As migration has steadily climbed up the European public and policy agenda, it has become increasingly recognized that migration can be affected – intentionally or not – by interventions in the kindred arenas of development policy and assistance, as well as by wider policies and practice in the foreign and domestic spheres. Yet, the precise links among these arenas of policy and practice, not least in terms of cause and effect, are imperfectly understood by analysts as much as by policymakers.

This paper will try to analytically describe the different migration-development links. The first paragraph will be focused on the concepts of Recruitment-Remittances-Return, whilst the second paragraph will entail the different phases of the migration-development link in an historical perspective. The third paragraph will be focused on the conceptual shift from development into transnational term. Finally some critical views of this latter commonly used concept will be reported.

1. MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT LINKS

Conventionally, international migration is understood to occur as a consequence of imbalances in developmental between sending and receiving societies. The most basic assumption is that if growth in material resources fails to keep up with demographic growth, strong migration pressures from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to DCs will evolve.

In classical theory, migration occurs due to a combination of supply-push and demand-pull factors. Diminishing migration pressures are thus dependent on eliminating levels of overpopulation and poverty in LDCs. Leaving aside the question of whether there is any empirical basis for this assumption, the migration-development link is often understood to revolve around the "three R's" of recruitment, remittances, and return (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991).

Recruitment is generally understood as intimately related to the conditions producing emigration. Such conditions include both migrant motivation (why people migrate) and facilitating factors/agents (what/who makes movement possible). Negative or low economic growth, population growth, high under- and unemployment rates, combined with unequal income distribution, and high pressures on land and urban environments drive people to seek employment abroad due to a lack of alternatives back home. Poor governance is another major factor for emigration, especially among the highly skilled. Recruitment mechanisms range from individual to collective, from official to unofficial, and from government-led to employment-led. There is no consensus on the optimal recruitment mechanism, but evidence suggests that worker recruitment eventually creates networks linking particular rural or urban communities in the sending countries with specific labour markets in the receiving countries (Gamburd, 2000). When such networks are established, they become valuable assets for those who have access to them. Moreover, they represent the means by which migration becomes a self-perpetuating, semi-autonomous process.

Depending on their income in the migration destinations, migrants' contribution to local development in the sending countries can be significant. Migrant remittances benefit local households in LDCs by sustaining daily living and debt repayment (Athukorala, 1993). Over time, remittances may be invested in consumer durables, and in better housing, education, and the purchase of land or small businesses. At the national level, remittances contribute positively to the balance of payments by providing much-needed foreign exchange.

The remittance-development link is highly debated (Massey et al., 1998; Taylor, 1999). Evidence suggests that remittances affect LDCs by: first being spent on family maintenance and improvement of housing; then being spent on "conspicuous" consumption (often resulting in tensions, inflation, and worsening of the position of the poorest); and finally, however, remittances are invested in productive activities, including improvement of land productivity.

Any analysis of the developmental impact of remittances needs to consider the initial conditions under which people go abroad. Poor families obviously need more time than the better off to gain from migration (Gamburd, 2000).

The most important claim is that financial remittances carry a huge potential for poverty reduction and local business and infrastructure investment. This statement is supported by the observation that remittances very often are resistant or even counter-cyclic to economic recession. Several studies have suggested that remittances often keep on flowing from immigration to emigration contexts despite recession in the country of immigration (such as Ratha, 2003). Even more strikingly, the amount of remittances transferred to developing countries through officially sanctioned channels, such as banks or money transfer services, has increased sharply over the past several years – from about US$40 billion in 1990 to US$167 billion in 2005, up to US$338 billion in the year 2008 (IOM, 2005, p. 270; World Bank, 2009). Although in 2008 total net official development assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reached its highest figure ever recorded – at US$119.8 billion (OECD, 2009), officially recorded remittance flows are still three times higher.

Second, despite the fact that financial remittances still stand at its core, in this new round of enthusiasm strong emphasis has been placed on the transfer of skills, knowledge, and social remittances from the North to the South. With such a shift in perspective, the perception of the costs and benefits of migration has also changed. Over the course of many years, in particular during the 'brain drain' of the 1970s, the loss of skilled personnel educated and trained in emigration countries in the South and their movement to the North without proper compensation, was one of the main concerns of development agencies and emigration-side governments. In the 1990s and 2000s the consequences of knowledge transfer have been re-coined into 'brain gain'. Nowadays, there are supposedly more win-win situations for mobile persons, states and societies on the different sides of the migratory process (Doyle, 2004). In addition, current debates hinge upon the newer concept of 'social' remittances, referring to the flow of ideas and practices (Levitt, 1998). In this interpretation social transfers shall promote development given that they are 'good' since they are related to modernity and modern development, reflected in human rights, gender equity, and democracy, to name only the most obvious ones.

Third, part of the 'new mantra' is the desirability of temporary labour migration based on the expectation that temporary migrants will constitute no loss in human capital and furthermore transmit a higher percentage of their income than permanent immigrants. This view was prominently propounded by the Global Commission on International Migration in its 2005 report (GCIM, 2005). Recent efforts have taken this notion further, in particular with the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006, and the recent report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2009).

Cutting across all forms of remittances, it is not only recent labour migrants who are thought to remit but also settled migrants. Moreover, there has been a shift from considering return to the country of origin as the best way of contributing to development, to other perspectives on migrants settled in immigration countries who return temporarily on short or extended visits – for example, professionals in the scientific realm who transmit their knowledge. Overall, these three broad claims are tied to migration management and control. It is the hope expressed in many policy documents and official statements by political institutions such as the European Commission (2005) that, in the long run, economic growth supported in part by financial, knowledge and social remittances will reduce 'migration pressure' in the sending countries.
Return is generally seen as the natural "end product" of the migration cycle. Ideally, migrants are expected to have saved capital and acquired skills abroad that can be productively invested in the sending country. Evidence nevertheless suggests that migrants, unless highly skilled, often do not acquire skills abroad that are useful at home. If skills are acquired, returning migrants often prefer to work in another, generally private, sector back home (Martin, 1991). Return is not necessarily promoted by home governments who may have a more direct interest in continuing flows of remittances than in incorporating returnees in the local labour market. Incentives to return have therefore primarily been initiated by receiving countries (Collinson, 1996). A study of Jamaican return migration suggests that return programmes attract only a few migrants and generally only those who were already planning to return (Thomas-Hope, 2002). To the extent that poor governance in the country of origin determines highly skilled migration, return of skilled migrants can only be expected when local governance radically improves.

Assessing migration-development links through the three R's tends to reduce migration to an economic act and to view migrants in their role as labourers only.

2. THREE PHASES OF THINKING ON THE MIGRATION–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

The fundamental claims associated with the migration–development enthusiasm presented in current academic and policy discourses are not as new as they appear. Looking at the past 60 years, that is, when development became established as a policy field and as a discourse in both the developed, industrialized

world on the one hand and the developing, technologically modernizing and often decolonizing states on the other hand, considerable similarities but also some important shifts in thinking can be observed. From a simple cost-benefit point of view, the original idea posits that the flow of emigrants and the accompanying brain drain are partly or wholly compensated for by a reverse flow of money, ideas and knowledge. Over time, this perspective was challenged by more critical evaluations rejecting the potentials of migration for development. With a slightly different emphasis and with new political instruments, the positive view on potentials has returned. It is not surprising that the conceptualization of the nexus between migration and development mirrors the dominant development paradigms and their changes over the decades with migration always playing an important but changing role. The following three phases, elaborate by Thomas Faist (Faist:2000) can thus be distinguished:

Phase 1: migration and development – remittances and return

In phase 1, during the 1950s and 1960s, public policy emphasized the need to fill "labour gaps" in the North with migrant workers and thereby also contribute to 'development' in the South. The latter was supposed to result from financial remittances, return migration and the subsequent transfer of skills and knowledge that this involved (Kindleberger, 1967). This view corresponded to overall economic modernization concepts in development thinking and to a belief that state capacity could shape economic growth as well as control migration according to national needs. Moreover, it was congruent with the textbook mantra in economics, which suggests that the emigration of surplus labour from underdeveloped areas leads to a new equilibrium between capital and labour (see Lewis, 1954): if labour goes North, labour scarcities in the South should then attract inflow of capital and, eventually, lead to economic development in the South (cf. Hamilton and Whaley, 1984). This academic thinking was mirrored in policies: both sending and receiving states of migrant workers articulated the need for temporariness and return based on the expectation that returnees brought new knowledge and qualifications with them. Nonetheless, retrospectively, critical voices asked whether the magnitude of international migration was high enough to have a significant impact in creating labour scarcities in the emigration countries and thus a need for the introduction of more advanced technologies. In addition, it seemed questionable whether financial remittances were of a scale that went beyond consumption and added to an increase in productivity and economic growth (cf. Hermele, 1997).

Phase 2: underdevelopment and migration – poverty and the brain drain

In phase 2, during much of the 1970s and 1980s, the term 'development' came to be replaced by 'dependency' as a structural condition of the periphery dominated by the centre, and 'underdevelopment' was seen as its inevitable result. During this period – in which dependency theory and later on world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974) criticized developmentalist modernization theory – the nexus was conceptualized in the reverse. Rather than working from migration to development the assumed causality moved from underdevelopment to migration (see, for example, Portes and Walton, 1981). Brain drain was one of the most important concerns in this period. In a dependency perspective, underdevelopment led to the loss of the well-educated and most qualified persons, who migrated from the periphery to the centres in the dependent world and, above all, into industrialized countries.

This out-migration, in turn, was thought to contribute to even more underdevelopment and increased migration flows through asymmetric distribution of benefits and resources working in favour of the economically developed centres. At the same time, from the early 1970s most European countries started to cut off official recruitment and closed their main gates, keeping only side doors open for selected categories of immigrants. Since less skilled workers found it increasingly difficult to enter the economically advanced

countries because of more restricted recruitment schemes, academic and policy attention focused even more on the implications of highly skilled migration.

Although current assessments tend now to highlight positive linkages, evidence for the brain drain thesis is easy to spot nowadays as well. For example, in 2005, between one-third and one-half of the so-called developing world's science and technology personnel lived in OECD countries. Even those views which give a nuanced account of the positive effects through return, investment and educational benefits, observe 'brain strain hotspots' where out-flow is not balanced by counter-flows and thus severely hampers socio-economic development (Lowell, Findlay and Stewart, 2004). This is the case, for instance, for greater parts of the health sector in sub-Saharan Africa where the World Health Organization warned of the damaging effects of this 'care drain' (for example, Stilwell, 2004). In stark contrast to many African countries suffering from brain drain, countries developing quickly along economic lines, such as Taiwan, South Korea and the People's Republic of China, have increasingly managed to re-attract students and experts from abroad and thus could change the situation into 'reverse brain drain' (Zweig, 2006). These stand at the centre of public attention in this third phase.

Phase 3: migration and (co)development – the celebration of transnational circulation

We are now observing a third phase which has been underway since the 1990s. In this phase the idea of what in French policy circles has been called co-développement best describes the dominant public policy approaches. This idea puts the migrant at the centre of attention identifying him or her as the development agent par excellence. In this phase the migrant has been constituted as an element of development cooperation. Along with it goes a reversal of the nexus taking us back to a more optimistic view, akin to the 1960s. Again, nowadays, international migration is supposed to fuel development. Most emphasis is placed on financial remittances and many attempts aim at facilitating and channelling individual and collective money transfers. In addition, skills, flows of knowledge and social remittances have also gained significance (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). Current initiatives thus cover a wider range of topics around the circulation of people, money and ideas.

First, temporary and circular migration are presented as the ideal combination contributing to economic development by way of remittances while at the same time curtailing brain drain through early return and re-insertion. Such perspectives are reflected in many recent policy recommendations, for example those of the Global Commission to increase opportunities for short-term labour migration (GCIM, 2005). Second, temporary return and brain circulation are among the allegedly new measures. Not only permanent return migration but also temporary stays, shorter visits, and other forms of mobility promoting knowledge transfer are thought to address development issues. For instance, 'diaspora knowledge networks' composed of scientists and R&D personnel, innovative business start-ups (cf. Rauch, 2001), and professionals working for multinational companies (Kuznetsov, 2006) are supported by states, development agencies and international organizations such as UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme or the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Third, this recent approach addresses the circular transactions of established migrant groups and diasporic communities in community development and post-conflict reconstruction (De Haas, 2006; Van Hear,. In this phase, new actors are being heavily promoted by sending and receiving, developing and developed states as well as through inter- and supra-national agencies. Thus, acknowledgement of ties and movements across national state borders enters the picture, hence transnationalization.

3. FROM DEVELOPMENT TO TRANSNATIONALISM

A part from economic reasons, there are other dimensions – social, cultural, and political – that also must be taken into account.

Migrant diasporas and transnational practices

An important result of the extraordinary new focus on migration is a much greater awareness of the significance of migration, including the factors motivating migration, the factors attracting migrants to particular destination areas, the social networks linking areas of origin with areas of destination, and the improved communication and transportation networks enabling longdistance ties across geo-political divides. Over the past ten years, academic and other literature has stressed the importance of locating migration within transnational processes in terms of global economies and the formation of transnational migratory groups. The literature provides essential new insights into contemporary forms of migration and also raises general conceptual issues about ways of understanding migration in a global context.

Contrary to conventional migration theory's binary focus on the process of emigration from and immigration to particular nation states, transnational approaches suggest that migration should be understood as social processes linking together countries of origin and destination. Contemporary migrants are designated "transmigrants" in as far as they develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, social, economic, political, organizational, and religious – that span borders (Glick Schiller et al., 1992: 1-2). Contrary to prevailing interpretations that portray migrant settlement as a process involving a break with home, transnational approaches suggest that the struggle for incorporation and adaptation in migrant destinations take place within a framework of interests and obligations that results from migrants' simultaneous engagement in countries of origin and destination. Thus, contemporary migration can only be understood by studying socio-economic, political, and other relations spanning sending and receiving societies (Levitt, 2001).

But transnationalism is not limited to migrants' activities and networks. Migrants have become increasingly important, not only as a source of remittances, investments, and political contributions, but also as potential "ambassadors" or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad. Many migrant-sending states recognize that although many migrants are unlikely to return, they can still advance state consolidation and national development from abroad (Levitt, 2001). Migrants have the potential to be organized into strong lobbies that advocate for sending country interests. In response, sending states may endow migrants with special rights, protections, and recognitions, in the hope of ensuring their long-term support (Basch et al., 1994; R.C. Smith, 1998; Guarnizo, 1997; Roberts et al., 1999).

The interplay between "transnationalism from above" (by sending states) and "transnationalism from below" (by migrant groups) is evident in the practices of numerous "homestate" and "hometown" associations connecting migrants and their resources to their homelands often by promoting community development projects (Goldring, 1998; M.P. Smith, 2001); it is also often seen in governments offering bonds at high state-guaranteed rates of interest to undertake major national development projects by mobilizing worldwide diasporic loyalties (Rayaprol, 1997; Sengupta, 1998).

Recently, international development agencies like the World Bank and the Inter- American Development Bank have acknowledged the development potential of migrant diasporas. Initiatives to leveraging the impact of migrant remittances, such as by supporting regulatory reforms that will enable popular savings and micro-credit institutions to become formal regulated institutions, are being discussed (Martin, 2001).

While in phase 1 policy-makers and researchers principally looked on remittances and return migration as a way of transferring resources across borders, in phase 2 the overcoming of development was seen as more critical. Now in phase 3, the landscape of alternatives has widened in an era of 'globalization',

'network society' or 'world society'. What we observe is an ever-increasing emphasis on transnational circulation.

All of the new initiatives point to the importance of new transnational agents, that is, 'diasporic' actors. The now prevalent paradigm of phase 3 presumes that migrants and other geographically mobile persons, and those with whom they associate, may be engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border practices.

The emergence and activities of these new transnational actors and initiatives require a transnational perspective. Most globalization theories, world system theory and the world polity approach share a perspective on world-spanning structures and world-wide dynamics and thus are helpful in conceiving social structures beyond the national state as part of larger processes. They provide insights into the broader political, economic and cultural opportunity structures within which the relevant agents move. However, they exclusively focus on top-down processes and generally neglect agency, that is, how global processes materialize in local situations and how actors span cross-border networks (Faist, 2010).

Globalization approaches generally share a bird's-eye view. They take world spanning structures as a point of departure and ask how such structures and associated processes impact and shape lower-level structures and dynamics, for example, on the level of national states and below. In these accounts, the nexus of migration and development is hardly addressed. Even more, migration itself often does not receive great attention and many of the frequently cited works pay scant attention to the mobility of people (Albrow, 2007; Castells, 1996). If they do, they often portray it in a somewhat romantic way, depicting migrants as smooth interlocutors of cosmopolitan lifestyles (Beck, 2007). With the exceptions of David Held and his collaborators in their sweeping account of global transformations (Held et al., 1999), there is an odd silence on the mobility of persons in general and on migration in particular, and their role for concomitant – global and local – societal changes.

Transnational approaches in and beyond migration scholarship certainly do not form a coherent theory or set of theories. Nonetheless they share a focus on migrant agency (Basch et al.,1994), transnational social structures (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998), such as transnational communities (Portes et al., 1999) or diasporas (Bauböck and Faist, 2010).

The recent discovery of migrants as transnational development agents is embedded in and accompanied by broader structural changes and a paradigmatic shift in relation to the thinking on development and on migration and migrant communities. The macro-structural conditions of this current phase of the migration and development nexus shifted significantly. In addition, the changes in the political and discursive structures need to be considered: first, the constitution of the relationships between the state, the market, and civil society and community established in development thinking; second, geo-political changes since the end of the Cold War and the new political role of diasporas; and, third, the securitization of migration accompanying the discourses and measures favouring circulatory migration and migrants' transnational engagement. The elements of this new paradigm are also reflected in the agency of organizations, networks and other actors and the ways states deal with these.

4. THE TRANSNATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND ITS CRITICS

Transnationalism – a set of sustained long-distance, border-crossing connections – is not of course representative of migrant populations alone. Such kinds of connection are to be found within global corporations, media and communications networks, social movements, criminal and terrorist groups. Structural comparisons between these and migrant forms of social organization have rarely been explored (see Vertovec 1999a, 2003).

Specifically with regard to migrants, over the past ten to fifteen years the study of transnationalism has rapidly ascended within social scientific research on migration. The general perspective is summarized by Ayse Caglar (2001: 607):

Current scholarship on transnationalism provides a new analytic optic which makes visible the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration. It allows an analysis of how migrants construct and reconstitute their lives as simultaneously embedded in more than one society.

Just as in the broader study of migration, the study of transnational connections among migrants also carries sub-themes focusing on important areas such as ethnicity and identity, gender, family, religion, remittances, entrepreneurship and political participation.

Since transnationalism hit the migration studies scene in the late 1980s, however, one of the central questions asked by scholars of the subject is: how is so-called transnationalism different from other aspects of, or takes on, migration?

Gathered from a variety of published articles, conference sessions and workshop debates concerning the transnational lens on migrant communities, a recurrent set of criticisms – 'the usual suspects', as Steven Vertovec calls them, are evident. These are 'the usual suspects' by way of two meanings: (a) the same criticisms are persistently repeated (often without taking account of how they have actually been addressed by a variety of scholars), and (b) although purporting to critique 'the transnationalism literature', critics (such as Kivisto 2001, Fitzgerald 2002, Nagel 2002) most often focus on specific works by a small set of authors (especially Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc, the contributors to Smith and Guarnizo 1998, and Portes). The usual suspect criticisms (Vertovec:2004) usually entail one or more of the following issues:

• conceptual conflation and overuse: 'transnationalism' is often used interchangeably with 'international', 'multinational', 'global' and 'diasporic'. There is also the problem of suggesting that all migrants engage in transnationalism;
• oldness/newness: questions abound as to whether transnational activities among migrants are new, and to how, or to what extent, they are new;
• sampling on the dependent variable: researchers have looked for transnational patterns and found them. What about the cases in which transnationalism doesn't develop, or what conditions particular forms of transnationalism?
• trans-what?: research and theory have not adequately problematized the difference between trans-national, trans-state and trans-local processes and phenomena;
• transnationalism vs. assimilation (vs. multiculturalism): false dichotomies between these terms have been posited, rather than a robust account of their inter-relationship;
• technological determinism: are contemporary forms of migrant transnationalism merely a function of today's modes of real-time communication and cheap transportation?
• not all migrants are transnational: even within specific groups or local communities, there is great variation in migrants' border-crossing practices;
• generational limitation: are current patterns of transnational participation among migrants going to dwindle or die with the second and subsequent generations?

Of all these critiques, the oldness/newness one is probably raised most often. Questions as to what's old and what's new about transnational migrant practices have been ably handled by scholars such as Ewa Morawska (1999), Nina GlickSchiller (1999), Nancy Foner (2000) and Rob Smith (2003). Alejandro Portes (2001) has notably dealt with this issue, too, by recalling Robert Merton's notion of 'the fallacy of adumbration': that is, once a social scientific idea has been formulated, it is easy to find historical anticipations of it. This does not dismiss the idea. As Smith (2003) says, 'if transnational life existed in the past but was not seen as such, then the transnational lens does the new analytical work of providing a way of

seeing what was there that could not be seen before.' Still, it might be true to say that long-distance connections maintained by migrants one hundred years ago were not truly 'transnational' – in terms of one contemporary sense of regular and sustained social contact (Portes et al. 1999); rather, such earlier links were just border-crossing migrant networks that were maintained in piecemeal fashion as best as migrants at that time could manage. Theoretically, it is in fleshing out just such differences between the meaning of transnational practices and migrant networks that research, data, analysis and criticism can importantly contribute to migration studies.

Recently we have seen considerable conceptual tuning concerning modes, levels, extents and impacts of transnationalism. For example, theorists have formulated typologies such as: transnationalism 'from above' (global capital, media, and political institutions) and 'from below' (local, grassroots activity)(Smith and Guarnizo 1998); 'narrow' (institutionalised and continuous activities) and 'broad' transnationalism (occasional linkages)(Itzigsohn et al. 1999); 'great' (of state and economy) and 'little' transnationalism (of family and household)(Gardner 2002); 'linear' (including plans to return to place of origin), 'resource-based' (linked with labour market position and mobility) and 'reactive' transnationalism (especially based on discrimination) (Itzigsohn and Saucido 2002); 'broad' (including both regular and occasional activities) and 'strict' transnationalism (regular participation only)(Portes 2003); 'core' (patterned and predictable around one area of social life) and 'expanded' transnational activity (occasional practices in a wider array of spheres)(Levitt 2001a,b).

Such types of transnationalism are variably manifested among different categories of people whose quests for work or 'mobile livelihoods' (Sørensen and Olwig 2001) involve them in transnational migration circuits (Rouse 1991) or patterns of circular migration (Duany 2002). These categories include undocumented migrants (Hagen 1994), refugees and asylum seekers (Koser 2002), religious figures (Riccio 1999), highly skilled workers generally (Vertovec 2002) and information technology workers employed through 'body shopping' (Xiang 2001) along with programmes to encourage so-called 'brain circulation' of trained occupational specialists between diasporas and homelands (Meyer and Brown 1999).

Arguably, too, each kind or degree of transnationalism differentially affects people (a) who travel regularly between specific sites, (b) who mainly stay in one place of immigration but engage people and resources in a place of origin, and (c) who have never moved but whose locality is significantly affected by the activities of others abroad (Mahler 1998, Levitt 2001b).

The examples of types, specificities and differences surrounding migrant transnationalism are perhaps conceptually burdensome, but arguably necessary, refinements in order to counter the kinds of criticism that the notion of transnationalism has attracted. The refinements provide clearer ways of mapping the infrastructures of transnational relations (cf. Held et al. 1999). Transnational patterns and their impacts naturally vary with regard to a host of factors, including family and kinship structures, conditions in places of migrant origin and reception, transportation or smuggling routes, communication and media networks, financial structures and remittance facilities, legislative frameworks regarding movement and status, and the economic interlinkage of local economies. Such infrastructures have at least two effects on transnational linkages.

Infrastructures may facilitate or constrain the extensity and intensity of global connectedness in any single domain. This is because they mediate flows and connectivity: infrastructures influence the overall level of interaction capacity in every sector and thus the potential magnitude of global interconnectedness. (Ibid.: 19).

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion in this section has endorsed the view, expressed by Held et al. (1999: 9), that 'the power of national governments is not necessarily diminished by globalization but on the contrary is being

reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of processes of governance in a more interconnected world.' Political features of migrant transnationalism – particularly surrounding dual citizenship/nationality and 'homeland' allegiances – are contributing to a fundamental reconfiguration of the conceptual nexus 'identities-borders-orders'.

The challenges that political forms of migrant transnationalism pose to 'identities-borders-orders' seem to counter the continuing salience of the nation-state, at least in terms of border control and immigration.

To close with, a possible way through this seeming contradiction is offered by Bauböck (2003), who proposes that:

A political theory of transnational migration must therefore carefully distinguish two different phenomena: an increasing permeability of international borders for geographic mobility, which does not challenge territorial jurisdictions, and an increasing overlap of political identities and legal statuses between the sending and the receiving polity.

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