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*The influence of L.Rajk's trial on Hungarian foreign policy in the late 1940s to the early 1950s.*

The role of Mátyás Rákosi and the Soviet counsellors in the process of preparation for L.Rajk's trial in 1949.

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## Abstract

Although there were several kinds of cruelty during the Second World War, Yugoslavia and Hungary had close relations from 1945 to June 1948. However, everything was changed after the decision of the second meeting of Cominform. It had a great inference on Hungarian diplomacy toward Yugoslavia and Hungary took the lead in active anti-Yugoslav propaganda by Stalin during the late 1940's and the first 1950's.

László Rajk's trial in 1949 marked the start of cruel series of death sentences, life sentences and long-term imprisonments in Hungary. Along with a strong anti-Yugoslav media campaign, there were frequent incidents along the border, which worsened Yugoslav-Hungarian relations and brought them to the brink of armed conflict.

L.Rajk was the Minister of Interior and was one of those communists who had strong links to Yugoslavia. In August 1948, after a visit to Moscow, he was suddenly removed from the post of Minister of Interior and placed in the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, which had much less involvement in Hungarian politics. On 30th May 1949, L.Rajk, several members of the Hungarian Workers' Party and several Yugoslavs were arrested. They were officially charged with espionage on behalf of Western powers, with the goal of the physical destruction of M.Rákosi, of creating a faction in the Hungarian Workers' Party and of separating Hungary from the socialist sphere.

The most interesting fact in L.Rajk's trial was not that L.Rajk admitted that he planned to divide the Hungarian Workers' Party, but that he mentioned Tito and the Yugoslav communists during the preliminary investigation. Moreover, there were two Yugoslavs, Lazar Brankov and Milan Ognjenović, who were also arrested with L. Rajk as accomplices in his plot. And they all mentioned a relationship between Rajk and Tito in court.

Nowadays, it is a generally accepted opinion that Rajk's trial was one of the biggest anti-Yugoslav campaigns at that time and that Matyas Rákosi played the main role in the process of the preparation for Rajk's trial. Moreover, there is several evidence that could be proof of the fact that Rákosi asked Moscow to give him advice to carry out the trial.

The aim of this paper is to analyse relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, paying attention to L.Rajk's trail, which became the crucial trigger of the deterioration of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, and the role of Mátyás Rákosi and the Soviet counselors in the L.Rajk's trial. The author of the paper tried to write it on the base of Russian, Hungarian and Serbian archive documents.

## Keywords

Hungary, Yugoslavia, Public Trials, Communist Party, L.Rajk's Trial, 1949, the Soviet Union, M. Rákosi



## 1. Introduction

During the late 1940's and early 1950's Hungary took the lead in active anti-Yugoslav propaganda by the "Eastern Bloc". László Rajk's trial<sup>1</sup> marked the start of cruel series of death sentences, life sentences and long-term imprisonments in Hungary. Along with a strong media campaign, frequent border incidents brought the Yugoslav-Hungarian relationship to the brink of armed conflict.

Only Stalin's death in March 1953 paved the way for reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the "Eastern Bloc". As in the previous era, Hungary was one of the fastest countries, after the Soviet Union, to take the initiative for normalization of relations with Yugoslavia (under pressure from Moscow whose diplomacy toward Yugoslavia changed after Stalin's death.). However, Belgrade wasn't ready to establish relations with Hungary without the rehabilitation of L.Rajk. As the reconciliation was moving ahead between Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, Moscow required that M.Rákosi normalize relations with Yugoslavia. M.Rákosi had to get a support from the Soviet Union to keep his position in the party, however, to agree to the rehabilitation of L.Rajk put at risk his position not only in the party, but in the country.

On 27 March 1956, when M.Rákosi made an address to the nation in Eger, a Hungarian city, he at last acknowledged that L.Rajk's crime was just a fiction. Nonetheless, he argued that the responsibility for escalating anti-Yugoslav attitudes in Hungary in connection with L.Rajk's trial was on L.Berija and his Hungarian colleague G.Peter, who was arrested in January 1953<sup>2</sup>. M.Rákosi never confessed that he soiled his hand in the preparation for L.Rajk's trial. He concealed his criminal role in the organization of L.Rajk's trial until he left office. Nonetheless, it is now a generally accepted opinion that Mátyás Rákosi played the main role in the preparation for L.Rajk's trial. The aim of this paper is to analyze relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, paying attention to L.Rajk's trail, which became the crucial trigger of the deterioration of Yugoslav-Hun-

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1 - The Laszlo Rajk's trial was one of the biggest show trials of Communist leaders which had held by Communist governments from 1949 to 1952 for the purpose of anti-Yugoslav propaganda. In general, show trials served not only domestic purposes but diplomatic ones. The first anti-Yugoslav show trial engineered by Moscow was the trial of Albanian leader Koçi Xoxe which took place as late as May-June 1949. Then, the L.Rajk's trial was hold in Hungary (September 1949) and the following was the trial of Bulgarian leader Traicho Kostov (December 1949). The last show trials of Communist leaders was the trial of Rudolf Slansky – held in Czechoslovakia in November 1952 –, although its character was not only anti-Yugoslav propaganda but anti-Semitism itself.; See. Ruud van Dijk et al., eds., *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, Volume II. ( London and New York: Routledge, 2008)

2 - Стыкалин А.С., Прерванная Революция: венгерский кризис 1956 года и политика Москвы. Москва. 2003. С. 42



garian relations, and the role of Mátyás Rákosi and the Soviet counsellors in the L.Rajk's trial<sup>3</sup>.

## 2. Yugoslavia-Hungarian relations from 1945 to 1948

Although there were several kinds of cruelty during the Second World War (the atrocities of Horthy's gendarmeries in the territory of Vojvodina, during its occupation in April, 1941 and reciprocal actions of Serbian guerrillas from which the Hungarian population suffered, and so on), Yugoslavia and Hungary had close relations from 1945 to 1948, until the moment when Cominform decided to oust Tito from the organization.

Keeping good relations with Yugoslavia had several meanings for Hungary. First, it gave this defeated country a way out of political-diplomatic isolation in the post-war years; secondly, development of cooperation on Danube Basin; and lastly, the settlement of territorial problems and the problem of Hungarian minority in the neighbouring countries of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. There was no disagreement about the necessity of rapprochement with Yugoslavia among parties in Hungary – all parties of the ruling coalition considered it as a priority foreign policy<sup>4</sup>. The Hungarian Communist Party also believed that having a good relationship with its neighbors was important, and especially that rapprochement with Yugoslavia was necessary for them. They hoped for its support in conflicts with Czechoslovakia and Romania. After elections on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1945 Z. Tildy's government considered the development of multilateral cooperation with neighbors on the basis of mutual understanding to be one of its priorities<sup>5</sup>. On 30<sup>th</sup> November 1945 Prime Minister Z.Tildy, who was just selected at the State Assembly of Hungary, said that the Hungarian government would refuse to carry out a chauvinistic policy<sup>6</sup>. F.Nagy, who succeeded as prime minister after February 1946, also said that Hungary had a chauvinistic tone in its policy in past. However, Nagy rejected that policy, which had been one of the causes of serious tension in the region and said that now the Hungarian people sincerely wanted to be good neighbors with the other nations of the Danube Basin<sup>7</sup>. As a first step, they tried to support a plan to create a Yugoslav-Hungarian-Romanian customs union, which was included in the political program of the Hungarian Communist Party in September 1945<sup>8</sup>.

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3 - There are several works mentioned L.Rajk's trial, for example, Fejto F., *Histoire Des Democracies. L'ere de Staline. 1945-1952* (Paris, 1972); Сас Б., *Без всякого принуждения. История одного сфабрикованного процесса* (Moscow, 2003); Hajdu T., *A Rajk-per háttere és fázisai. Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest 1992. 11); Pukosti A., *Rákosi a csucson. 1948-1953.* (Budapest, 1996); Желицки Б.Й., *Трагическая судьба Ласло Райкаю Венгрия 1949 г.*// *Новая и Новейшая история.* 2001. №2. С. 125-138; №3 С. 166-186 (Moscow, 2001); Мурашко Г.П., Носкова А.Ф., *Советское руководство и политические процессы Т.Костова, и Л.Райка*// *Сталинское десятилетие холодной войны: факты и гипотезы.* 1999. С. 23-35 (Moscow, 1999) etc.

4 - See: magazine "Nepszava", 13th and 20th January 1946; Newspaper "Kis Ujsag", 30th January 1946

5 - See: newspaper "Szabadsag", 10th February 1946

6 - Ibid.

7 - Ibid.

8 - Архив Внешней Политики Российской Федерации (далее АВП РФ), Ф. 77, Оп. 19, П. 12а, Д. 11, Л.99

From the end of the Second World War, Hungarian political leaders tried to settle the problem of Hungarian minority which had resulted from the Treaty of Trianon. There were problems with neighbour countries – Slovakian Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Hungarians in Transylvania in Rumania and Hungarians in Vojvodina and Croatia in Yugoslavia. Hungary had demanded the improvement of rights for Hungarian minorities in these countries, however, it was not going smoothly except in Yugoslavia. They had a serious issue with Czechoslovakia, which deported the Hungarian minority from Slovakia (later, called an exchange of populations). Hungarian political leaders expected Yugoslavia to act as an intermediary in talks between Hungary and Czechoslovakia – and several times Tito helped to settle the problem of an exchange of populations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although it was not carried out<sup>9</sup>. Hungarian political leaders deeply appreciated Belgrade's help to settle the problem with Czechoslovakia. M.Rákosi, when meeting with Stalin in summer 1947, expressed his gratitude for Yugoslav politics to Stalin<sup>10</sup>.

In this period, economic relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia also began to develop. At first, there was a problem of reparations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, which were enemies during World War II. Talks between the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Hungary about reparations from Hungary had begun in the middle of March 1945 in Debrecen<sup>11</sup>. According to a letter from Yugoslavian delegation to Tito, K.E. Voroshilov, who was a chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, told them that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia had to share 100 million American dollars – 50 million to Yugoslavia and 50 million to Czechoslovakia<sup>12</sup>. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1947, Hungary agreed to pay 50 million American dollars to Yugoslavia<sup>13</sup>.

After World War II, Yugoslavia believed that, from an economic point of view, they needed to get natural resources, such as coal or coke, from Hungary. At first, they wanted to occupy the Hungarian territory around Pecs and Baja, which were rich with natural resources<sup>14</sup>. On 9<sup>th</sup> January 1945 Stalin had a meeting with the Yugoslav delegation, the head of which was A. Hebrang in Moscow. At the meeting, A. Hebrang revealed his hope to get this territory. However Stalin did not show his support for the idea. At the

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9 - Вида И. Международное положение Венгрии после Второй мировой войны // Восточный блок и советско-венгерские отношения: 1945-1989 годы. Под ред. О.В. Хавановой, А.С. Стыкалина. Москва. 2010

10 - Российский Архив Социало-Политической Историй (РГАСПИ), ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 314, л. 9

11 - Czechoslovakian delegation also had to be there, but they had not arrived by the start of the talk. See: Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva Inostranih Poslova Republike Srbije (DAMIP), PA, Mađarska, pov., 1945, f. 23, br. 334

12 - At first, Yugoslavia considered that their situation during the Second World War was worth then that of in Czechoslovakia (DAMIP, PA, Mađarska, pov., 1945, f. 23, br. 340-341), so, later, they tried to ask Moscow to up their reparation to 65 million dollars. (DAMIP, PA, Mađarska, pov., 1945, f. 23, br. 346) But it did not succeed.

13 - Later, because of a political conflict, economic relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia were stopped in 1948. The problem of reparations between Yugoslavia and Hungary was finally solved only on 29th May 1956, when they concluded an agreement in which it was written that Hungary would have to pay 85 million dollars with delivery of goods over the next five years.; See: Стыкалин А.С. Советско-югославское сближение (1954 – лето 1956 гг.) и внутривосточная ситуация в Венгрии.// Человек на Балканах в эпоху кризисов и этнополитических столкновений XX в. Санкт-Петербург. 2002. С. 329

14 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., Исламов Т. М. и др. Восточная Европа в документах Российских архивов, 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы., Т. 1, 1944 – 1948 гг. Москва-Новосибирск. 1997. С. 126

end of April 1946, the Hungarian delegation headed by M.Rákosi visited Belgrade and, at that time, Tito started talking about a territorial problem. Finally, Tito promised not to line up the problem of territory in the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 in compensation for receiving the right to use the oil field that was located on the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, they had received the right to get 100.000 ton of bituminous coal, 4000 ton of coke from Pecs at that time<sup>16</sup>.

There were also close relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia in the cultural field. Besides the development of multilateral cooperation and mutual understanding with Yugoslavia and other nations of the Danube Basin, Z.Tildy's government mentioned that one of the important tasks for the government after the Second World War would be the establishment of close cultural relations with them<sup>17</sup>.

The minister of culture Dezső Kereszturi also talked about cultural policy and its use in developing international relations with neighbors at a press conference on 9th February 1946.

On the other hand, Tito's government also believed that having a close relationship with this neighbor country was very important. The Yugoslav government said to Gyöngyösi, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of September 1945 that they were ready to give back all of the Hungarian prisoners of war to Hungary<sup>18</sup>. This reflected the policy of Tito's government toward Hungary. Moreover, an address by Tito in April 1946 met with a great response. He declared his brotherly feelings towards Hungary and it was widely reported in the Hungarian press<sup>19</sup>. After that the Hungarian press in general took up the problems of the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement and frequently wrote about the necessity of expanding communications<sup>20</sup>.

We can consider one reason why Tito's government believed that having a close relationship with this neighbor country was very important for them. Yugoslavia at that time was a "new" country with a Left-wing politics. Therefore, they needed more and more support within the country and of course, in Vojvodina, too. They wanted to be attractive to the Hungarian minority that lived in Vojvodina and to Hungarian politicians in Budapest. For example, the new Yugoslav government allowed the celebration of Hungarian holidays in Vojvodina<sup>21</sup>. On 14-21 June 1947 Hungarian delegation visited Vojvodina with the aim of knowing the situation of Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. When the meeting with Hungarian population in Vojvodina occurred, the Hungarian delegation asked Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia to pledge their allegiance to Yugoslavia. Later they submitted the Hungarian government a report in which they expressed an appreciation of the Yugoslav policy toward the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina<sup>22</sup>.

Actually, Hungary and Yugoslavia had an active cultural exchange in every kind of spheres until the middle of March 1948. On 15<sup>th</sup> March 1948, the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of

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15 - Gibianski L. The Hungarian-Yugoslav territorial problem in Soviet-Yugoslav political contacts 1945 – 1946 // History & Politics. III. Bratislava Symposium November 12-15. 1992. Bratislava. 1993. 114 p.

16 - DAMIP, PA, Mađarska, pov., 1945, f . 23, br. 449

17 - See: newspaper "Szabadsag", 10th February 1946

18 - АВП РФ, Ф. 77, Оп. 19, П. 12а, Д. 11, Л.93

19 - See: for example, "Szabadsag", 3th April 1946

20 - See: for example, "Szabadsag", 31st March and 17th April 1946

21 - Кимура К. Венгрия и Югославия в 1945-1948 гг. От оживления разносторонних связей к глубокому кризису в дипломатических отношениях // Славянский мир в третьем тысячелетии. Межкультурный и межконфессиональный диалог славянских народов. Москва. 2011. С. 195

22 - Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOR), XIX-J-1-j 1945-1964 Jugoszlávia, 25d., 16/b, 2891/pol./ 1947

Hungarian Revolution in 1848 was held in Budapest<sup>23</sup>. It was held to promote cooperation in Danube Basin<sup>24</sup>; therefore, Yugoslavia also actively took part in this commemoration. On 28<sup>th</sup> November 1947 at a meeting of the anniversary's committee, the aim of this festival was declared by the Hungarian president Zoltán Tildy – to establish a system of cooperation between the democratic countries, to realise the democratic ideas of the 1848 revolution and, most importantly, to emphasize the necessity of cooperation among the people in Danube Basin by using the ideas of Kossuth<sup>25</sup>. In December 1947 when the Yugoslav delegation arrived in Budapest, the Minister of Information Mihályfi invited Tito to the celebration of the 100-year-old anniversary of the Hungarian revolution in 1848. Tito accepted this invitation and suggested developing a plan for carrying out of the anniversary<sup>26</sup>.

At that time not only Hungary and Yugoslavia, but also all countries of people's democracies considered cooperation in the Danube Basin very important. For example, despite the existence of problems of national minorities in Transylvania, Romania also actively participated in this anniversary. Additionally, at a meeting with the Polish delegation in January 1948, the new Minister of Culture Gyula Ortutay mentioned the importance of mutual understanding among the countries of people's democracies<sup>27</sup>.

The important point is that, despite the reality of opposition by Serbs and Croats against Hungary during the Revolution of 1848, the Hungarian government managed to use the concepts of the Hungarian Revolution in 1848 as means for strengthening the friendship of the people of the Danube Basin. Of course, Tito knew this fact; nonetheless, he also wanted to use this celebration for the purpose of cooperation in the Danube Basin. This demonstrates that establishing friendship in the Danube Basin was very important for the leaders of countries of "Human Democracy".

Thus, Hungary and Yugoslavia had an active cultural exchange in every kind of spheres and were admiring in the press each other's policy for national minorities during the second half of 1940's. However, only in two weeks after the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in 1848, M.Rákosi wrote a letter to Tito with sharp criticism of Belgrade's politics and relations between the two countries were getting worse.

### 3. The Conflict between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

At that time antagonism between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been developing. First, due to the idea of a federation or confederation of the Balkans and the countries of Danube Basin, which included Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece. Secondly, due to the behaviour of the Yugoslav foreign policy, which decided to order Yugoslavia's division into Albania without consultation with the Soviet military advisers.

23 - АВП РФ, Ф. 77, Оп. 25, П. 24, Д. 41

24 - As I mentioned above, 1848 was a year of "national independence" for Hungary. One of the readers of Hungarian revolution 1848 – Kossuth Lajos – later went to Italy and in 1862 he, with Klapka György, proposed the idea of "Danube Valley Federation Project". It was based on the idea of peaceful cooperation in the Central Europe, in which many nations were living. Later, some of politicians looked for a way to realize this idea. For example, in 1918, the Hungarian politician – Jaszi Oszkar – proposed to build a Danube Federation on the base of Kossuth's idea. In his works, he mentioned the future of Hungary and the nations in Central Europe, and he emphasized that only the idea of a "Danube Valley Federation Project" could solve the problem of nations in Central Europe. Although its shade of meanings has changed from time to time, the Kossuth idea of a "Danube Valley Federation Project" has been considered as an ideal way to solve the problem of the nations in Central Europe.

25 - АВП РФ, Ф. 77, Оп. 25, П. 24, Д. 41, Л. 1-2

26 - АВП РФ, Ф. 77, Оп. 25, П. 24, Д. 41, Л. 3

27 - АВП РФ, Ф. 77, Оп. 25, П. 24, Д. 41, Л. 10



On 1<sup>st</sup> February 1948 a telegram was sent from Moscow to Yugoslavia. The telegram stated that “the USSR wouldn’t agree so it was confronted with a *fait accompli*. And it is, of course, clear that the USSR as the ally of Yugoslavia, can’t bear responsibility for the consequences of the action of the Yugoslav government without consultations and even without the knowledge of the Soviet government... Apparently, there are serious disagreements between our governments in understanding the mutual relations between our countries connected by an alliance”<sup>28</sup>. Having received this telegram, Tito tried to describe this situation as “an annoying individual exception”, but the Soviet Ambassador Lavrentev reminded him that already there had been a similar case when Yugoslavia signed the contract on cooperation with Bulgaria in 1947.

On 11<sup>th</sup> February, on the day when the Soviet-Yugoslav report on mutual consultations was signed, a conversation between E.Kardelj and V.M.Molotov took place, in which, besides questions of economic and military cooperation, Kardelj informed Molotov that Tito wanted to visit Moscow in March or April to eliminate misunderstanding. On 13<sup>th</sup> February, at the time of a meeting with Kardelj, Molotov informed him that Stalin positively responded to Tito’s proposed visit<sup>29</sup>.

On 19<sup>th</sup> February at a session of the Political Bureau of the KPJ Central Committee, the condition of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was discussed. In that session Tito didn’t pay attention to divergences between Belgrade and Moscow and repeated: «I believe that there is no serious divergence now. Our line in foreign policy remains as it was»<sup>30</sup>.

However, relations with Moscow became complicated again at the beginning of March 1948. On 1<sup>st</sup> March during a session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Tito reconsidered the condition of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, specifying contradictions on the Balkan questions, the refusal of arms for the Yugoslav army and a tightening the Soviet party on signing a trade agreement. Tito was dissatisfied that the USSR refused to enter into a trade agreement with Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union entered into similar agreements with other countries. He spoke about it in a meeting with the USSR ambassador A.I. Lavrentev in Yugoslavia. On 12<sup>th</sup> March, at the session with Stalin in which 12 members of the Central Committee VKP(b) participated, Lavrentev read a paper about the situation in Yugoslavia. Judging by reports, the decision was made to refrain from sharp steps concerning Yugoslavia<sup>31</sup>.

On 18<sup>th</sup> March, the Central Committee VKP(b) presented to M.A.Suslov a vast amount of material prepared on the instructions of the leadership titled “About anti-Marxist installations by the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in questions of external and internal policy”. It is probable that by the end of March the decision to put pressure upon the Yugoslav leadership to toe the party line was made<sup>32</sup>.

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28 - Едемский А.Б. От конфликта к нормализации: советско-югославские отношения в 1953 - 1956

годах. Москва. 2008. С. 19.

29 - Едемский А.Б. Ibid. С. 19. Автор опирается на: Гибианский Л.Я. От первого ко второму совещанию коминформа// Совещания Коминформа, 1947, 1948, 1949. Документы и материалы. Москва. 1988. С. 338.

30 - Едемский А.Б. Ibid., С. 20. Автор опирается на: Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog Komiteta KPJ (11 jun 1945 – 7 jun 1948)/ Priredio B. Petranović. Beograd, 1995. S. 234. Dok. 34: Sastanak Politbiroa СК КПЈ. 19. II. 1948.

31 - Едемский А.Б. Ibid. Ibid., №. 20, 22.

32 - Едемский А.Б. Ibid. Ibid., №. 21 – 23.

## 4. The Conflict between Yugoslavia and Hungary

On 27<sup>th</sup> March 1948 a letter signed by Molotov and Stalin was sent to Tito and the KPJ Central Committee. It was written on the basis of a 18<sup>th</sup> March note from the VKP(b) Central Committee. This letter was sent not only to I.B. Tito and the KPJ Central Committee but also to nine members of the Information Bureau<sup>33</sup>.

Of the Information Bureau members who received this letter, the Hungarian Communist party reacted most quickly. On 8<sup>th</sup> April 1948, M.Rákosi sent a letter to Tito under the title “Decision of Political Bureau of the Hungarian Communist Party”. In that letter, M.Rákosi expressed mistrust of the Yugoslav Communist Party<sup>34</sup>. The letter contained six points;

1) Because of the incorrect political behaviour of Yugoslavia, an intolerant position has developed and misunderstandings between the KP of Yugoslavia and the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) were created;

2) The underestimation by Yugoslavia of the supervising role of the Soviet Union in emancipating the working class and a revaluation of Yugoslavia’s role;

3) The expectation of the Hungarian Communist Party of an adjustment on the inadmissible position of the Yugoslav Communist Party;

4) Members of the Political Bureau should protect sincere and close relations which connect “our” party with the Soviet Union and with our great teacher Stalin from any forces threatening to these communications;

5) The Hungarian Communist Party completely agrees with the basic positions of the letter of VKP(b) Central Committee;

6) The VKP(b) Central Committee’s letter which was sent to Yugoslavia has great value for Hungarian Communist Party, too.

The reply to the letter from 8<sup>th</sup> April 1948 was confirmed at the plenum of the Central Committee of Yugoslav Communist Party, and it was sent on 19<sup>th</sup> April with the title “the letter of the plenum of Central Committee of Yugoslav Communist Party, as the answer to the letter of Stalin and Molotov”. In the letter, great discontent with the behaviour of the Hungarian Communist Party was expressed; “The Hungarian Communist Party has no right to attack our leaders, our party and our country so irresponsibly in front of the VKP(b)”. The Yugoslav party showed great wrath that Hungary acted in this manner “after all that the Yugoslav party has done to advance democratic forces in Hungary to strengthen in the country”<sup>35</sup>. The position of the Yugoslav Communist Party was that “leaders who struggled for democracy at the time of the Second World War in 1941 couldn’t imagine a situation in which they are criticized by those countries which were aggressors during the Second World War.”

At the end of April, the Hungarian Communist Party sent an answering letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> April, which was confirmed by the Political Bureau of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Hungary. In the letter, the Hungarian Communist Party stated that, having considered letters from Yugoslavia, it had reached the conclusion that “both letters could only confirm and underline the correctness and justice of the criticism”, and justified that “not one of the members of our Central Committee talked with a member of Central Committee VKP(b) about the affairs of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia”.

33 - Едемский А.Б. Ibid., С. 26. Автор опирается на: Гиренко Ю.С. Сталин – Тито. Москва. 1991. С. 338.

34 - Arhiv Jugoslavije (далее AJ), fond 507/IX – Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze Centralnog komiteta SKJ (далее f. 507/IX – КМОВ СК SKJ), 75/I – 14

35 - Arhiv Jugoslavije (в Белграде), F. Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije (дальше AJ - f. KMJ), I-3-b, 420. л. 5–6

In short, Hungary rejected criticism of themselves and showed discontent with tone of the letter from the Yugoslav Communist Party. Referring to Stalin's and Molotov's words<sup>36</sup>, the Hungarian Communist Party emphasized that their behaviour was correct and they asked the Yugoslav leaders "so that they would reach the necessary conclusion based on the letters of Stalin and Molotov, with the aim that all brotherly Communist Parties would have a unanimous position on this question" and would show a readiness to protect the position of Soviet Union, Hungary insisted that Yugoslavia «would have to change from its incorrect position»<sup>37</sup>.

By the end of April, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia also took this position in relation to Yugoslavia. Of the ten Communist Parties who received the 27<sup>th</sup> March 1948 letter from Stalin and Molotov that had been addressed Tito, only M.Rákosi answered this letter immediately. On 8<sup>th</sup> April 1948, M.Rákosi sent an answer to Stalin, which stated their support for the position of the Soviet Union. Stalin sent M.Rákosi's letter to all Communist Parties as an example of a "good student" of Stalin.

## 5. L.Rajk's trial and its character

As I mentioned above, during the late 1940's and early 1950's a storm of anti-Yugoslav campaign had been raging in "Eastern" Europe – a mountain of articles criticising Yugoslav politics, radio broadcasts and some public trials. In particular, Hungary took the lead in active anti-Yugoslav propaganda by the "Eastern Bloc". The László Rajk's trial marked a special position among anti-Tito trials.

Many members of the Hungarian Workers Party had personal relations with Tito. Many of them were volunteer soldiers in the civil war in Spain, and they had endured the war at the front or in camps in France (and also in Switzerland<sup>38</sup>) together with volunteer soldiers from Yugoslavia. Thus, a lot of Hungarian communists who had contacts with communists from Yugoslavia held important posts in the cabinet, militias, armies and parties.

L.Rajk was the Minister of Interior and was one of those communists who had strong links to the communists from other countries in Europe<sup>39</sup>. In August 1948, after a visit to Moscow, he was suddenly removed from the post of Minister of Interior and placed in the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, which had much less inference in Hungarian politics. This can be seen as the first step in the organization of L.Rajk's trial. On 30<sup>th</sup> May 1949, L.Rajk and several members of the Hungarian Worker's Party were arrested, officially on the charge of espionage in behalf of western powers, with the goal of the physical destruction of M.Rákosi, creating a revolution in the Hungarian Worker's Party

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36 - Stalin's and Molotov's words; "We certainly recognize the right behind any Communist Party... to criticize any other Communist Party."

37 - AJ-f. KMJ, I-3-b, 420. л. 24 – 25

38 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., Исламов Т. М. и др. Восточная Европа в документах Российских архивов, 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы., Т. 2, 1949 – 1953 гг. Москва. 1998. С. 179

39 - L.Rajk's biography was written by a functionary in Cominform in April 1949. In this biography writer hinted at the fact that L.Rajk might have links with some European countries (for example, he had worked in France from 1929-1931; he had been an émigré in Czechoslovakia from 1936-1937; he joined the Popular Front in the Spanish Civil War, and so on). At the same time, the biographer placed emphasis on L.Rajk's sins throughout his life. On the whole, the tone of the report was that L.Rajk had placed importance not on his relations with Soviet Union, but with other nations. See; Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., Исламов Т. М. и др. Восточная Европа в документах Российских архивов, 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы., Т. 2, 1949 – 1953 гг. Москва. 1998. С. 64-67



and the aim of separating Hungary from the socialist sphere<sup>40</sup>.

The most interesting fact in L.Rajk's trial was not that L.Rajk admitted to the plan of the revolution in Hungarian Worker's Party, but that he mentioned Tito and the Yugoslav communists during preliminary investigation. On 16<sup>th</sup> September 1948, L.Rajk and his "accomplices" were prosecuted for ostensibly forming a plot to transfer Hungary to the control of the USA and for receiving military aid from Yugoslavia<sup>41</sup>. Acknowledging the indictment, L.Rajk confessed to these crimes and gave the names of a number of Yugoslav statesmen as people who were enlisted together with him during their stay in Spain and in camps in France. Diplomats, correspondents, and communists from different countries (not only East Europe, but also Western Europe) were invited to the trial<sup>42</sup>. Accepting Rajk's confession, the main prosecutor declared that the main point of that court consists, actually, not in accusing L.Rajk and his "accomplices", but that, by sentencing L.Rajk and to his "accomplices", he could simultaneously show Tito's and the Yugoslav communist's "guilt" to the whole world. On 10<sup>th</sup> September, the indictment was published all over the world<sup>43</sup> and, on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1949, L.Rajk was given the death sentence. In the middle of October, the sentence was carried out.

Soon after L.Rajk's death sentence was carried out, the Yugoslav government sent a letter to the Hungarian government (on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1949). In this letter the Yugoslav government raised an objection to Hungarian attitude toward Yugoslavia<sup>44</sup>. Both sides considered that they had been having intimate relations until 1948<sup>45</sup>, however, L.Rajk's trial put a halt to their relations at the governmental level.

## 6. The truth of L.Rajk's trial; preparation for the trial and its influence on politics in the countries of "People's Democracy"

In 1956, M.Rákosi confessed that L.Rajk's crime was the result of the work of the secret police<sup>46</sup>. In memoirs which were written after his resignation in 1956, M.Rákosi stated that L.Rajk's trial was organized by BeriJa together with his Hungarian subordinate – G.Peter<sup>47</sup>. However, archival documents show that the initiative in working out the concept of L.Rajk's trial belonged to M.Rákosi<sup>48</sup>. S.G.Zavolzhsky, an officer of Secretary Kominform, testifies that he had a meeting with Rakosi on 11<sup>th</sup> July 1949 – 2 months before L.Rajk's trial<sup>49</sup>. He mentioned that M.Rákosi informed about three basic

40 - Волокитина Т. В. и др. Советский фактор в Восточной Европе. 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы., Т. 2, 1949 – 1953 гг. Москва. 2002. С. 171

41 - See: newspaper "Известия", 11th September 1949, № 215 (10055)

42 - 47 foreign correspondents from 14 countries were invited on the trial. There were 29 communists-correspondents (representatives of the USSR and countries of people's democracy, and also France, Italy etc. However, Yugoslavian journalists were not allowed to be present), see: Волокитина Т. В. и др. Советский фактор в Восточной Европе. 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы. 1944 – 1953, Т. 2, 1949 – 1953 гг. Москва. 2002. С. 171

43 - Волокитина Т. В. и др. Ibid., С. 171.; «Известия» 13 сентября 1949 г., №216 (10056)

44 - Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva Inostranih Poslova Republike Srbije (DAMIP), PA, Mađarska, pov., 1949, f 67, br. 417397

45 - See: for example; MOR, XIX-J-1-j, 1945-1964, Jugoszlávia, 42d., 30/e, 10.159-1949

46 - Волокитина Т. В. и др. Ibid., С. 171.

47 - See: "Людям свойственно ошибаться. Из воспоминаний М. Ракоши"// "Исторический архив". Москва. 1997. № 3. С. 112

48 - Волокитина и др. Советский фактор в Восточной Европе. 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы. 1944 – 1953, Т. 2, 1949 – 1953 гг. Москва. 2002. С. 176 – 177

49 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., Исламов Т. М. и др. Ibid., С. 181 – 183

“facts” in this conversation: first – that L.Rajk had contact with Tito, who promised him military aid to accomplish a revolution in Hungary and to organize a state system of the Yugoslav type. Secondly – that there are at least two Yugoslav spies in Czechoslovakia, and that he had already informed K.Gottwald about it, but members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia didn't believe it<sup>50</sup>. Third – M.Rákosi felt that L.Rajk's group was going to kill him. Other archival documents testified that M.Farkas – a member of the Political Bureau and the Minister of Defense – along with M.Rákosi made a plan to bring L.Rajk to court, having added inventions about communications with Tito<sup>51</sup>. It is known that during the preparation for L.Rajk's trial M.Rákosi attentively discussed the trial with his “friends”, including advisers who had been sent from Moscow by KGB's general M.I.Belkin. Even during L.Rajk's trial, on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1949, Rákosi listened to the process from the beginning to the end of the judicial session through a loud-speaker which had been placed in his office. Reportedly Rákosi often called and asked G.Peter a lot of questions on a phone that was especially placed in G.Peter's office<sup>52</sup>. As a result, on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1949, with a preliminary agreement with Stalin, L.Rajk was sentenced to death<sup>53</sup>.

The main aim of L.Rajk's trial was to condemn Tito's politics through a public trial of L.Rajk. In 1948, when Cominform demanded that Tito appear before its court, he refused. Moreover, Tito never admitted his “guilt”, to the contrary, he was absolutely assured of his correctness. Because of that, it was necessary for Moscow to show Tito's “crime” to the whole world by organizing an event like L.Rajk's trial. Thus, M.Rákosi thought up this “event” with the approval of Stalin – this opinion is already widely confirmed by many researches today<sup>54</sup>.

There is one more aspect in L.Rajk's trial. M.Rákosi wanted to add an international aspect to the L.Rajk's trial to solidify his position in the “Eastern Bloc”. At the same time as L.Rajk's arrest, on 29<sup>th</sup> May 1949, Czechoslovakian communist G.Pavlik was also arrested along with his wife for having a relationship with the American journalist Noel Fльд and a Hungarian man Tibor Shon<sup>55</sup>. They were transferred by the Czechoslovak party to Hungary on 31<sup>st</sup> May 1949. An agency of Hungarian state security informed Prague that G.Pavlik admitted transferring espionage data and confessed the names of people with whom he cooperated. There were some people who were members of Czechoslovak party, including members of the Presidium of Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. K.Gottwald didn't believe this information. However, the Hungarian Communist party had put intensive pressure upon the Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party. During the visit to Prague on 21<sup>st</sup> – 24<sup>th</sup> June 1949,

50 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., Исламов Т. М. и др. Ibid., С. 219 – 224

51 - In the day, when S. G.Zavolzshsky had a conversation with M.Rákosi, he met also other secretary of Hungarian Worker's Party – M.Farkas – with whom discussed the same question. M.Farkas in that day – two months before L.Rajk's trial – already knew words of sentence which would be taken out on the court. See.: Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., Исламов Т. М. и др. Ibid., С. 179 – 181.

52 - Сас Б. Без всякого принуждения. История одного сфабрикованного процесса. Москва. 2003. С. 266 – 268

53 - Materials for court of L.Rajk's trial were published in many newspapers (and also in the form of brochures) See.: Волокитина и др. Ibid., С. 216 – 222. В Советском Союзе они были опубликованы в газете «Известия» с 17 по 27 (19 и 26 числа газеты не издавались) сентября 1949 г.

54 - For example, Váli Ferenc – an American historian who was Hungarian by origin – wrote about it in the book, “Rift and Revolt in Hungary” (USA, 1961). François Fejtő also insisted on this topic. And it is necessary to note the book Б. Саса «Без всякого принуждения. История одного сфабрикованного процесса», (Москва. 2003). In this book about the preparation for L.Rajk's trial is described in detail.

55 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., и др. Ibid., С. 171

M.Rákosi gave K.Gottwald a list of 65 Anglo-American spies in which 2 members of the Political Bureau of Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party were included. On 5<sup>th</sup> September 1949, the meeting of a member of Hungarian Worker's Party – Z.Biro – with K.Gottwald and R.Slansky was organized to hand over the letter from M.Rákosi. In this meeting there was a conversation about the preparation for L.Rajk's trial. K.Gottwald asked M.Rákosi to organize L.Rajk's trial without mentioning the names of Czechoslovak communists and, moreover, that it would only address Hungarian and Yugoslav affairs. According to Z.Biro, K.Gottwald behaved as if he could not believe that long-time members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party could become spies<sup>56</sup>. Then, on 16<sup>th</sup> September 1949, M.Rákosi sent Moscow a letter requesting that Soviet advisers from the Communist Party be sent to Czechoslovakia. On 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1949, K.Gottwald received a letter from Stalin which stated that “the state security ministry allowed sending instructions to Prague”<sup>57</sup>. After that, Prague changed their line and a purge in Czechoslovakia was carrying out faster and faster until R.Slansky's trial was held. It was the last public trial similar to L.Rajk's. Although R.Slansky's trial was not only anti-Yugoslav, but anti-Semitic in nature<sup>58</sup>, it is considered one of a series of anti-Tito campaign. R.Slansky was executed on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1952 on charges of espionage<sup>59</sup>.

On 16<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> November 1949, in Budapest, the third (and last) meeting of the Cominform took place. In that meeting, the next resolution was accepted: “Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the power of murderers and spies” (a report on this topic was given by G.Gheorghe-Dej). In G.Gheorghe-Dej's report<sup>60</sup>, he said that the main point in Yugoslav policy was to establish a “new” Communist Party which would be «revolutionary and internationalist» and capable of “resolute struggle” to liberate “from the yoke evaluated the meaning of L.Rajk's trial<sup>61</sup>.”

56 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., и др. Ibid., С. 221

57 - Мурашко Г. П., Волокитина Т. В., и др. Ibid. С. 168 – 172, 179 – 181, 219 – 224, 231 – 233

58 - In the USSR anti-Semitic campaign began at the end of 1947 when I.K.Goldstein and Z. G.Grinberg were arrested. After that a lot of public figures and figures of the Jewish origin were arrested in the USSR. 4 years later in the countries of Central and the Eastern Europe the most considerable action of an Anti-Semitic orientation – R.Slansky's trial was caused. R.G.Pihoja wrote about anti-Semitic campaign in detail. See.: Пихоя Р. Г. Советский союз: История власти. 1945 – 1991. Москва. 1998. С. 75 – 78. About R.Slansky's trial. See: Баберовски Й. и др. Сталин и еврей: Трагическая история Еврейского антифашистского комитета и советских евреев. Москва. 2008. С. 287 – 288

59 - J.Babrovski mentions that process R.Slansky's trial was organized by the order of I. V.Stalin on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1951. See.: Баберовски Й. и др. Сталин и еврей: Трагическая история Еврейского антифашистского комитета и советских евреев. Москва. 2008. С. 287

60 - G.Gheorghe-Dej's report and its text. See.: Адиебеков Г. М., Гибианский Л. Я. и др. Совещания Коминформа 1947, 1948, 1949. Документы и материалы. Москва. 1998. С. 629 – 642, 643 – 660

61 - M.A.Suslov's report stated the following estimation of L.Rajk's trial: “the trial in Budapest over espionage by L.Rajk - Brankov opened the large international plot which was organized by Anglo-American imperialists against the countries of people's democracies and Soviet Union, against the world and democracy. This plot of imperialists pursued realization of far-reaching plans: to dethrone by means of a fascist espionage clique of Tito which became an agency of the international reaction, a democratic system in Hungary and other countries of people's democracy, to tear off these countries from world and democracy camp, to restore in them reactionary fascist modes, to transform the countries of South-East and Central Europe in a puppet of imprints and bases for aggression”: Citation from: Адиебеков Г.М., Гибианский Л. Я. и др. Совещания Коминформа 1947, 1948, 1949. Документы и материалы. Москва. 1998. С. 551.

After the third Cominform meeting, a bloody wave of reprisals in the Soviet Bloc countries was stirred up – every country started searching their own “L.Rajk”<sup>62</sup>. Thus, L.Rajk’s trial is marked as one of the biggest events of the anti-Yugoslav campaign which was released by the initiative of Stalin. After the trial, Yugoslav leaders were accused not only as “revisionists”, but were called “spies and murderers”. And, of course, after the L.Rajk’s trial, diplomatic relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia were completely broken.

## 7. Conclusion – For what reason was it necessary for M.Rákosi to carry out Rajk’s trial?

I would like draw a conclusion about the reason why M.Rákosi suddenly decided to absolutely follow the Soviet way in these two weeks in March 1948 and why M.Rákosi decided to organize L.Rajk’s trial.

Before that, I want to analyze the reasons why Rajk and his fellow defendants confessed to be guilty in capital sins. There are three possibilities to consider. Firstly, they were severely tortured by Peter’s state security (AVH); secondly, they just pretended to serve the “Case of the Party”; thirdly, there was no chance to refuse. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to answer this question; however, after considering documents, papers, memoirs and other similar situations, such as public trials held not only in Europe but also in the Soviet Union under the Communist Parties, I came to the conclusion that they did not have any chance to refuse making a confession. Many of documents say that there is no doubt that Moscow had some influence on this show trial, and as far as Stalin agreed to hold the trial and took part in the process of the preparation of it, any communist could not refuse it.

It seems that M.Rákosi decided to organize L.Rajk’s trial under the pressure of necessity. As I mentioned above, M.Rákosi felt Stalin’s distrust of him and tried to remove any suspicions. Stalin knew that close Hungarian-Yugoslav relations brought about the solution of the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and a system of a cooperation of Danube Basin after Second World War. M.Rákosi, when the meeting with Stalin in summer 1947, said himself to Stalin; “I am deeply appreciated the mediation of Yugoslavia in talks between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the problem of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. ...I think that the Hungarian people feel closer to the Yugoslav nation than to Russian. Most people in Hungary are afraid of Russians because of their lack of knowledge about Russians.”<sup>63</sup> N.S.Khrushchev also remembered in his memoirs that “In the first post-war years, it seemed that sometimes he resisted Stalin. When Stalin mentioned the names of the next enemies of the people, among which there were some names of members of Hungarian Worker’s Party, M.Rákosi absolutely disagreed with it and tried to prove that they were fair people so that he trusted them. After that, Stalin ordered all brotherly parties advisers who were basically security officers. ... When M.Rákosi came to Moscow, he did not give a report to Stalin about enemies of the people in Hungary. Stalin specifically pointed to it; “Look, here there are people who are doing such a thing! You don’t see it. You are the blind man. The blind man will ruin business and will ruin himself.” M.Rákosi was defended only by himself. It happened in front of me. All members of the Political bureau of Central Committee Communist Party were there, but we all could say nothing. ....”<sup>64</sup>

62 - After L.Rajk’s process, the general Secretary of Central Committee of Czechoslovakian Communist Party – R.Slansky (later himself become a victim of terror) expressed that “in our country we also have to seek our «L.Rajk»”. See.: Fejtő François. Histoire Des Démocraties Populaires. L’ère de Staline. 1945 – 1952. Paris, 1972 – translation in Japanese. Tokyo. 1979. C. 235

63 - РГАСПИ, ф. 82, оп. 26 д. 1151

64 - Мемуары Никиты Сергеевича Хрущева// Вопросы истории. Москва. 1994. № 5. С. 73 – 74



Thus, there are foundations for believing that M.Rákosi had a great aspiration for independence and it irritated Stalin. But Rákosi could not exist in the Hungarian government without support from Moscow, so it could be thought that M.Rákosi was torn between “the Soviet way” and “the Hungarian way” to socialism and he decided on “the Soviet way”, because he could not exist in the cabinet without support from the USSR. Thus, because M.Rákosi felt Stalin’s distrust, he decided to of usurpers”. After the lecture, M.A.Suslov made a report in which he summarized and organize the L.Rajk’s trial.

And, at last, M.Rákosi wanted to solidify his position among the “Eastern Bloc” by using Rajk’s trial. As I mentioned above, M.Rákosi tried to add to the list of accused people the names of communists from other countries in the “Eastern Bloc”, first of all – Czechoslovak communists. He asked K.Gottwald to line up several names of Czechoslovak communists in the “confession” from the “criminal” at the time of Rajk’s trial (however, K.Gottwald refused that proposal.).

The question still remains, “why did he choose L.Rajk as a suspect?” Putting some data from archive documents and commemorations together, I came to the conclusion that the main reason that M.Rákosi decided on L.Rajk as a suspect was that he wanted to eliminate a strong competitor. Actually, L.Rajk was popular in the country and had a great deal of influence. In February 1949, L.Rajk became the general secretary of the People’s Front of Independence. On 1st May 1949, when the national celebration was held in Budapest, he stood next to M.Rákosi – this fact meant that L.Rajk was one of the most influential politicians in the country. Besides, L.Rajk sometimes resisted M.Rákosi on the decision of the Yugoslav question. Thus, it seems that M.Rákosi was, in a sense, afraid of L.Rajk – he was popular among Hungarian people because he was “good looking”, “tall” and “by origin, Hungarian” (M.Rákosi was by origin Jew). A Russian historian, N.V. Petrov, mentioned in his book that L.Rajk was not a “friend” to M.Rákosi and Gerö, as he had never been to Moscow as a political émigré<sup>65</sup>. At the same time, N.V.Petrov argued that there was no more suitable person in the Hungarian Communist Party for this “show trial” than L.Rajk, who had strong links with communists from the other countries, not only Yugoslavia, but other nations in Europa<sup>66</sup>. However, it was no doubt that all the details of L.Rajk’s trial couldn’t have been thought up personally by M.Rákosi. Another Russian historian V.Sereda observed that L.Rajk’s sentence could not be given without consultation with Moscow. L.Rajk’s trial was so important for Moscow that Stalin could not entrust its organization to a deputy. This trial would be a motivation of the anti-Yugoslav campaign process after all<sup>67</sup>.

Thus, M.Rákosi could establish his position in Hungary and among members of the “Eastern Bloc” after L.Rajk’s trial. He was seen as “a good student” of Stalin, and from the end of 1940th to Stalin’s death in 1953, he took active in the anti-Yugoslav campaign. Needless to say, Rajk’s trial and Hungarian foreign policy toward Yugoslavia (a mountain of anti-Yugoslav propaganda existed in every kind of sphere in Hungary) exerted a great influence on relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia until the middle of 1950s. Rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia started only after 1954 when the Soviet Union decided to normalize their relations with Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, Yugoslavia did not agree to repair their relations with Hungary without the rehabilitation of L.Rajk. Normalization between Hungary and Yugoslavia occurred only in October 1956, a day before the “Hungarian Revolution 1956” occurred.

65 - See L.Rajk’s biography; Мурашко Г.П., Волокитина Т.В., Исламов Т.М. и др. Восточная Европа в документах Российских архивов, 1944 – 1953 гг. Документы., Т. 2, 1949 – 1953 гг. Москва. 1998. С. 64-67

66 - Петров Н.В. По сценарию Сталина: роль органов НКВД-МГБ СССР и советизации стран Центральной и Восточной Европы. 1945-1953 гг. Москва. 2011. С. 189-190

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