Elections in Poland: A Revolution in Poland’s European policy?

written by Matteo Lunni
Associazione Italiana Polonisti

Europe: A community dreamed of by democratic Poland’s founders and  pursued with such zeal by the governments of the nineteen-nineties. Now, it appears, however, that something has changed.

Andrzej Duda, leader of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and a staunch “Euroskeptic”, emerged victoriously from Poland’s presidential elections on May 24, 2015.
Duda’s success, along with the growing momentum of other “Euro-cold’’ movements in England, Spain, Greece and Italy, could very well reshape European politics.
And while Euroskepticism is hardly Polish in nature, Poland is the first nation where a Eurosceptic has been elected the  Chief of State. Elsewhere, such movements have only succeeded in winning local elections or garnering a few parliamentary seats; whether Duda’s newfound success in Poland represents an exception to the rule or a wholly new rule itself is cause for concern in Brussels.

Additionally, the future of Polish policy with the European Union is in doubt: does this presidential election represent an impending departure from Warsaw’s historically pro-European policies? The coming months might shed light on Duda’s intended agenda; Brussels, as well as the observant world, will have to wait until his inauguration on August 6, 2015.
Yet this was not the first time the question of Europe has played a central role in a Polish election. As far back as 2001, before Poland even entered the European Union, PiS vocalized its dissent to the ascension process. However, if 2005 serves as an example of what may come, a shift in policy may not be as imminent as previously thought. When the Euroskeptic Kaczynski brothers became President and Prime Minister, Poland didn’t leave the EU. Instead, the nation took advantage of the opportunities presented by the mandatory assumption of European legislation regarding market liberalization, mobility of people, and,  due to the inflow of European structural funds, social cohesion and agriculture. Despite years of Euroskeptic leadership, Poland emerged as a stellar example of recovery and accession. In fact, a recent study demonstrated that European Community funds are best spent in, in terms of efficiency and effect, in Poland. Hardly the anti-Europe environment one would expect with the Kaczynski brothers at the helm.
Thus, Europe’s economic policies are not under as much scrutiny in Warsaw as they are in Athens or other European Union states. Instead, Poland’s EU disaffection is much deeper than economic policy.

Why, for a country that benefits so handsomely from European funds, is Euroskepticism so potent a force?

First of all: culture. Poland, a bastion and guardian of traditional values, is a protective nation, jealous of her national identity, hard-won after centuries of foreign occupation. In this way, the Polish polity feels threatened by a secular and relativist Europe, unimpressed and unconcerned with each member’s peculiarities, history and identity.
Moreover, Poland has struggled with immigration since the 1990s, without the aid of its European counterparts, similar to the Italy of 2015; waves of emigrants from troubled Asian and former-Soviet countries, crossed Poland’s long, relatively unprotected and porous eastern border. The sheer number posed a financial and logistical burden for the Central European nation. Once again the question of protecting Poland’s ethnic and national identity from ‘outsiders’ emerged alongside the issue of cheap labor. Competition between immigrants and Poles sparked backlash both in Poland and in other EU states, where Poles were already benefiting from Schengen. A decade later, the question of immigration is still pressing; however, in 2015, the debates surrounding immigration are strikingly more intense and European: A list of countries, amongst them Poland, would like a clear response from European institutions. Most are still waiting.
Finally, “geo-strategic” reasons may explain Poland’s Euroskeptism.  Many cling, or rather, remember, the “phantoms of the past”. Contemporary Europe is de facto controlled by Germany, an historical enemy of the Polish people. This alone could explicate the pervasive Polish distrust regarding Europe. And, to add fuel to the fire, following the privatizations of the 1990s, Germany acquired the largest share of formerly public enterprises; for many Poles, this economic fact appears less like opportunism and more like the unwelcomed return of German colonization.
And then there’s Russia. For economic and strategic reasons, Europe has always been “soft on Moscow”: avoiding conflicts with the Kremlin, holding back the creation of a missile defense system (the “missile shield” proposed by Bush Jr.) and  preventing Union enlargement in other former-Soviet nations. Warsaw, however, has consistently pushed for stronger responses to Moscow; in particular, Ukrainian accession to the European Union has long desired  by Poland to provide buffer-zone between Warsaw and the Kremlin. Poland and Brussels simply don’t see eye-to-eye.
For these reasons, Poland has saught support elsewhere, choosing to consolidate its alliance with the US and NATO, seen by the Poles as better equipped to mollify their national security concerns. As Russia has begun acting more aggressively, the United States has doubled down on their commitment to Poland, recently increasing military presence in the Baltic Sea and shifting the weight of their presence to Gdansk. These maneuvers underline the growing closeness between Warsaw and Washington.
A closeness which Duda, a devout Atlanticist, will further foster and which Europe, particularly France and Germany, ought to consider. At the very least, Polish dependence on Washington threatens the French and German goal of a completely independent –  and utterly European – Union. This is the most important takeaway from Duda’s victory in the Polish Presidential Elections.