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*Russian Foreign Policy, 2000-2011:
From Nation-State to Global Risk Sharing*

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Abstract

Russian foreign policy thinking has evolved significantly in recent years. Defined throughout the 1990s by a notable lack of any clearly defined strategic course, there is now a clear vision of the type of global order that Rus-

sia wants. Russian foreign policy thinking is reaching far beyond traditional realism to embrace global risk sharing, although the extent to which the country ought to embrace a truly global security agenda is still hotly debated. Too little attention has been paid in the West to this intellectual evolution, and to what it says about Russia's long term foreign policy goals.

Keywords

CIS, Dmitry Medvedev, Energy policy, Global risk sharing, Russian foreign policy, Russian national security policy, Sovereign democracy, Vladimir Putin

1 Introduction

Throughout the 1990s Russian foreign policy was characterized by inconsistency—a sharply hostile reaction to the country's financial dependence on the West combined with an almost servile acquiescence to the international agenda that had been established thanks to the global dominance of the United States. At the time Russia was very much a country in search of its own identity and its new place in the world. The deep economic and psychological scars left from the fragmentation of the USSR were clearly impeding the formation of any clear foreign policy consensus.

But in recent years Russia has grown stronger economically and more stable politically. As a result, its foreign policy has become more assertive. Most western analysts regard this as an afterthought, a return to traditional anti-Western habits, rather than a deliberate strategy. They continue to view Russian foreign policy as opportunistic, reacting haphazardly to global developments, and driven to assertiveness by the unpredictable price of oil. One consequence of this is that many Western analysts are inclined to view Russian foreign policy as inconsistent and thus more likely to yield to foreign policy interests that Western countries have pursued for decades. When Russia fails to yield to the "logic" of Western foreign policy analysis, this is often interpreted as evidence of misplaced nationalist pride, or a throwback to Soviet imperialism.

It is my contention that over the course of the past decade Russian foreign policy has become more consistent in its value choices than is typically acknowledged. Over the course of the past decade it has developed its own view of the patterns of world development, and is now systematically pur-

suing a global foreign policy agenda designed to further Russia's long term interests. As a result, Russia's foreign policy direction can now be predictably forecast over a span of years, if not decades, and this relatively new situation offers both challenges and opportunities for Russia's international partners.

One gets a clear sense of the steady evolution that Russian foreign policy thinking has undergone by comparing the two most recent official Foreign Policy Concept statements with president Medvedev's latest foreign policy pronouncements, including the much discussed "Program" for a western-oriented foreign policy that was leaked to the press in May 2010.¹

The priority during the first phase of this transformation was to re-establish Russia as an independent foreign policy actor. This was largely accomplished by the end of Putin's second term. The current phase seeks to expand Russia's influence in several new directions, but it remains tethered to political realism and the idea of exploiting Russia's influence as a global energy superpower. The next phase is more idealistic, but will have to resolve the difference among the many competing models of a multipolar global order, and then work toward the implementation of Russia's choice.

2 Phase One: Re-establishing Russian sovereignty

One of the first official tasks of a new Russian president is a comprehensive review of Russia's foreign policy. Putin's new *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, the first in seven years, began with the somber assessment that the previous administration's hopes of building beneficial, partner-like relations of mutual respect with the West "have proven to be unfounded."² Although the legacy of the Cold War was slowly receding, the authors warned of ominous signs of unilateralism and a notable weakening of the tutelary role of the UN Security Council. Russia's efforts to build a

¹Konstantin Gaaze and Mikhail Zygar, "Pust' opyat' budet Solntse," *Newsweek* (Russia) (May 9, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.runewsweek.ru/country/34166/%20%20%3Chttp://www.runewsweek.ru/country/34166/?print=Y>> (accessed 5/13/2010). The full text of this document, entitled "A Program for the Effective and Systematic Use of Foreign Policy Factors for Long Term Development of the Russian Federation," is available at <http://www.flot2017.com/file/show/normativeDocuments/24231>.

²Vladimir Putin, "Vneshnepoliticheskaya kontseptsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (June 28, 2000), available online at: <<http://www.mid.ru/mid/vpcons.htm>> (accessed 7/11/2000).

multipolar international system were hampered by its economic weakness, hence the country's first priority would be to "strengthen Russian statehood... and foster stable economic growth."³

In 2000 Putin's foreign policy review came to the conclusion Russia was no longer able to adequately defend its national interests. Economically it was so weak that it depended on foreign loans to cover current accounts. Such dependence translated into a constraint on its sovereignty. Russia therefore needed a long-term strategy to re-establish its sovereignty which has since become known simply as "the Putin Plan."⁴

At the heart of the Putin Plan lies the idea of "sovereign democracy." Popularized by a long time member of the President's senior staff, Vladislav Surkov, sovereign democracy describes Russia's optimal political system as one that allows the current generation to link the positive experiences of the Soviet past to the post-Soviet values that Russia needs to succeed in an economically integrated world. In order to do this the present generation must recognize that it was the Russian people themselves who rejected that Soviet past and embraced a democratic, European future. The fall of the communist system was thus "a return to [Russian] democratic values," says Surkov, not something imposed by foreign powers. As evidence he points to the loss of the USSR as the high price Russians were willing to pay to get their country back onto the democratic track from which it had been derailed in November 1917.⁵

According to the ideologists of sovereign democracy, casting the fall of communism as a victory of the Russian people rather than a defeat will allow them to deal with the past in a sober and respectful manner, while simultaneously moving beyond it. The ability to define the past on one's own terms is not only vital to forging political unity, says Surkov, but it allows the country to pursue reforms in a manner consistent with its own political culture. To become a truly sovereign country, he concludes, Russia must be-

³*ibid.*

⁴Nicolai N. Petro, "The Great Transformation: How the Putin Plan Altered Russian Society," Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale ISPI *Policy Brief* #132 (May 2009), available online at: <http://www.ispionline.it/it/publicazioni.php?id=1>. Russia's current president, Dmitry Medvedev has said that even, at the outset of 2000, he and others were "seriously thinking about how to work for the coming decades." Dmitry Medvedev, "Vystuplenie Pervogo zamestitelya Predsedatelya Pravitelstva RF Dmitryia Medvedeva na II Obscherossiiskom grazhdansom forume," *VIPerson.Ru* (January 22, 2008), available online at: <http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=419959&soch=1> (accessed 1/24/2008).

⁵Vladislav Surkov, "Suverenitet—eto politicheskii sinonim konkurentosposobnosti," *United Russia* (February 22, 2006), available online at: <http://www.edinros.ru/print.html?id=111148> (accessed 12/1/2006).

come economically competitive; to be competitive it must be governed democratically—which means, in a manner that reflects the traditions and values of the Russian people.⁶

Sovereign democracy also implies that all nations should be free to choose their own social and political systems.⁷ This in turn presumes multipolarity in global economic and international relations. Any monopoly on power, be it military, economic, or cultural, is a source of global injustice and therefore potentially destabilizing. "We sometimes hear" says Surkov, "that no one is interested in taking away our sovereignty (or that this is unreal), but the universal and daily need for resources and security is so great, and our supply of these is so rich, that excessive complacency here hardly seems appropriate."⁸

In 2006, Surkov even suggested that Russia might help to forge "an association of sovereign democracies (and free markets) against any global dictatorship (or monopoly). This would make national sovereignty a factor for just globalization and the democratization of international relations. There is both pragmatism and romanticism in this task... and perhaps, even a mission."⁹

2.1 Putin's Speech in Munich

Western analysts took little note of sovereign democracy until Putin's speech to the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 10, 2007. The speech itself was rather unremarkable, reiterating many of Russia's longstanding objections to unipolarity, but it focused attention on the source of the danger—the U.S. quest for absolute national security. In unusually candid language for a head of state, Putin laid out Russia's basic philosophical disagreements with this strategy, and urged his audience to consider whether absolute security was even possible.¹⁰

⁶Vladislav Surkov, "Russkaya politicheskaya kultura: vzglyad iz utopii," *Kreml.org* (June 8, 2007), available online at: <<http://www.kreml.org/opinions/152440881?mode=print>> (accessed 6/16/2007).

⁷Vladislav Surkov, "Natsionalizatsii budushchego," *Ekspert*, No. 43 (November 20, 2006), available online at: <http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_budushchego/print> (accessed 11/20/2006).

⁸Surkov, "Natsionalizatsii budushchego."

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Vladimir Putin, "Vystuplenie i diskussii na Miunkhenshoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki bezopasnosti," *Kremlin.Ru* (February 10, 2007), available online at: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/02/118109.shtml>> (accessed 2/10/2007).

Putin laid the blame for rising global instability on America's desire to impose a unipolar international system. "Nearly the entire legal system of one state—first and foremost, of course, the United States—has overstepped its national borders in all arenas." As a result, Putin says, "no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall behind which they can find shelter."¹¹ As an alternative, and foreshadowing Russia's later efforts to organize the BRICS nations into an international alliance, Putin proposed a new architecture of global security that would incorporate the interest of the new international actors now emerging onto the world stage.

In the West, Putin's *cri de coeur* is remembered simply as an anti-American rant. Its appeal to prevent the militarization of space, to provide ways for non-nuclear states to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to encourage investment in underdeveloped countries have been largely ignored. As a result, a strong signal that an economically resurgent Russia now felt it could push back against what it deemed to be destabilizing Western encroachment was missed, and the August 2008 crisis in the Caucasus is a direct result.

In retrospect, there was nothing pre-determined about Putin's growing annoyance with the United States. As London based Russian scholar Alena Ledeneva recalls that when Russia's military and political leadership met to consider how Russia should respond to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, "out of 21 people at that meeting only two thought that the president of Russia should support the president of the United States. One was Putin himself."¹² Others have noted how at crucial junctures regarding Iran, Afghanistan, and even relations with other CIS states, Putin often chose to help Washington when he clearly did not need to.¹³ Nevertheless, his decision

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Mark Franchetti, "Putin: How worried should the West be?" *The Times (UK)* (June 10, 2007), available online at: <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1909829.ece>> (accessed 6/11/2007).

¹³Mark N. Katz, "Policy Watch: Bush and Putin's Soul," *UPI* (April 24, 2006), cited in Johnson's *Russia List #2006-#96*, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 8/29/2006); Alexander Rahr and Nicolai N. Petro, "Our Man in Moscow," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 29, # 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 5-12. The last U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union notes that while Putin proved to be "as good as his word," cooperating with the US in Afghanistan, closing Soviet era bases in Cuba and Cam Ranh Bay, and even offering to amend the ABM treaty to permit building missile defenses against rogue states, but was offered little in return. Instead of reaching out to Russia, "president [Bush] at times acted like a prizefighter who bragged that he could put on blindfolds and still beat any opponent who dared to challenge him." Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Super-power Illusions: How Myths and False Ide-*

not to stand for re-election in 2008 was met with a sigh of relief in many Western capitals.

3 Phase Two: Russia, Forward!

As the new president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev's first trips abroad were to Kazakhstan and China. It was not until June that he travelled to the West, to Germany, to speak of his foreign policy priorities.¹⁴

He began his encounter with the West by telling his hosts that he rejected the idea that nations can be "made" to conform to Western standards. Instead, he called for a true dialogue of equals on human rights. He reminded his audience of German civic leaders that "Russian and European democracy share common roots. We share the same set of values and the same sources of law: Roman, Germanic and French law. I have said in the past that democracy is always shaped by history and by the national setting. We have a common history and we share the same humanitarian values. This common thinking is the foundation that enables us to speak not just the same legal or business language today but, I hope, also the same political language."¹⁵

Shortly thereafter, Medvedev undertook his own review of Russian foreign policy priorities. The main difference between this latest *Foreign Policy Concept*, signed on July 12, 2008, and Putin's lies not in its analysis of global trends, but in Russia's capacity to influence them.¹⁶ The new concept argues that Russia's primary goal must be to modernize and to create conditions that are conducive to the country's integration into the global economy. Once this is achieved, it will strive to forge "a crisis-resistant international system."¹⁷

ologies Led America Astray – And How to Return to Reality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 198.

¹⁴Dmitry Medvedev, "Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders," *Kremlin.Ru* cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#110, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 6/9/2008).

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Dmitry Medvedev, "Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation* (July 12, 2008), available online at: <<http://www.mid.ru/nsd-0-sndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/d48737161a0bc944c32574870048d8f7?OpenDokument>> (accessed 10/1/2008).

¹⁷*Ibid.*



"For the first time in modern history," Medvedev's document warns, "global competition is assuming a civilizational dimension which presumes a competition among different value systems and models of development, within the framework of universal democratic and market principles." The danger of what the late Samuel Huntington called "the clash of civilizations" is quite real, but the West's response has, to date, been limited to seeking ways to preserve its own privileges. Such efforts are "destabilizing."¹⁸

Respect for state sovereignty within a strengthened UN system is deemed essential to ensuring that international norms are applied universally and not as a bludgeon against only one group of states. Within this system Russia seeks to: "improve the manageability of the world development, [and] create a self-regulating international system, an effort that requires collective leadership by the leading States, which should be representative in geographical and civilizational terms."¹⁹

Regionally, Russia seeks to move from "good-neighborly" to "friendly" relations with the former Soviet republics, and then to "strategic partnerships and alliances" with those who wish it. The goal is to transcend the Cold War division of Europe and "guarantee the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region—from Vancouver to Vladivostok."²⁰

Speaking to a gathering of Russian ambassadors in July 2008, Medvedev highlighted the priorities of his new foreign policy: resisting attempts to advance national or group interests at the expense of international law; establishing a positive, rather than a negative, agenda for Europe based on "intensive economic interpenetration;" promoting the "collective leadership of leading states" as the basis for a new global security architecture; establishing "open systems of collective security;" and assisting the "psychological adaptation" of Russia's partners to the reality that Russia today is very different from the USSR.²¹

3.1 The Georgian Setback of 2008

The outbreak of armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008 radically altered how Russians view the West. Up until then Russian elites had tended

¹⁸*ibid.*

¹⁹*ibid.*

²⁰*ibid.*

²¹Dmitry Medvedev, "Vystuplenie na soveshchanii s poslami i postoyannymi predstavitelami Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri mezhdunarodnykh organizatsiyakh," *Kremlin.Ru* (July 15, 2008), available online at: <<http://kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/07/204113.shtml>> (accessed 10/1/2008).

to regard U.S. unilateralism as a misguided emotional response to 9/11, not as a concerted strategy of containment directed at Russia. Western indifference to who had actually initiated hostilities, and its near total disregard for the plight of the South Ossetians, led to widespread outrage.

As influential foreign policy analyst Fyodor Lukyanov put it, "Russia has been genuinely shocked by this foreign reaction and by the one-sided support that Georgian President Mikheil Saakasvili has received from the West, despite violating every conceivable humanitarian norm of civilized conduct. Moscow sees this as more than just a double standard, but as unabashed cynicism... Russia is now inclined not only to reject completely a path determined by Western values, but actually to deny that such values even exist."²²

"By backing Georgian aggression, the West has lost any moral authority," says Sergei Markov, an analyst with close ties to the Kremlin,²³ while the head of the Politika fund, Vyacheslav Nikonov, comments: "not only have we been denied condolences and support - but the West has responded with a firm promise to re-arm the aggressor... what would Washington have thought of us if Russia had responded to 9/11 by endeavoring to re-arm Al Qaeda?"²⁴ Outrage at the West was so complete that even regime opponents, like Yabloko party chairman Sergei Mitrokhin, human right activist Lev Ponomaryov, and jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky voiced their support for Medvedev's actions.²⁵

To calm public indignation, at the end of August President Medvedev announced five principles that would now guide Russian foreign policy and set a new framework for relations with the West:

²²Fedor Lukyanov, "Seven Theses Prompted By The Russia-Georgia Conflict," *RFE/RL* (August 26, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#158, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/2/2008).

²³Oleg Shchedrov, "Georgia war boosts Medvedev's status," *Reuters* (September 4, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#166, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/4/2008).

²⁴Vyacheslav Nikonov, "The War in the Caucasus: What is the West Refusing to Understand?" *Izvestia* (September 3, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#165, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/4/2008).

²⁵"Russia's use of force in South Ossetia is justified, says party leader," *Interfax* (August 10, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#146, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 8/25/2008); Paul Rimple et al., "Roots of Georgia-Russia clash run deep," *Christian Science Monitor* (August 12, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#147, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 8/25/2008); "Khodorkovsky одобрил deistviya Medvedeva v Yuzhnoi Osetii," *Obshchaya gazeta* (September 11, 2008), available online at: <<http://og.ru/news/2008/09/11/41296.shtml>> (accessed 9/11/2008).

- First: Russia asserts the primacy of the basic principles of international law;
- Second: The world should be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable, domination is impermissible;
- Third: Russia does not seek with any country and has no intention of isolating itself from world events;
- Fourth: Russia's priority is to protect the life and dignity of its citizens, wherever they may be. It will also seek to protect the interest of its business community abroad;
- Fifth: Russia, like other nations, has regions of privileged interests—countries with it has traditionally had cordial relations. Russia intends to expand relations with these states, its close neighbors.²⁶

Later that year, at the first World Policy Forum at Evian, France, Medvedev reiterated Russia's view that "transparency and equality in international relations" should become the basis for stability in financial and security matters, and proposed a new European security treaty to arrive at such stability. This treaty should conform with the UN Charter; make the use of force (or even the threat of force) inadmissible; establish truly equal security guarantees, with no claim of exclusive prerogatives in maintaining peace and stability by any nation or group of nations; and finally establish a common framework that defines what constitutes reasonable military development within the context of Europe.²⁷

At the same time Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, issued a stern warning to the West about meddling in CIS affairs:

"To us, the CIS space is not a 'chessboard' for playing geopolitical games. It is a common civilizational area for all the people living there, one that keeps our historic and spiritual legacy alive. Our geography and economic interdependence give tangible competitive advantages to all of the Commonwealth countries.... The response of some western countries to the South Ossetia crisis... vividly illustrates a morality deficit. Those incapable of siding with truth and justice simply cannot, no matter how hard they try, represent the whole of European civilization, not to speak of the incompatibility of such an approach with other civilizations and cultural traditions."²⁸

²⁶"Medvedev sets out five foreign policy principles in TV interview," *BBC Monitoring* (August 31, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#163, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/4/2008).

²⁷Dmitry Medvedev, "Vystuplenie na Konferentsii po mirovoi politike," *Kremlin.Ru* (October 8, 2008), available online at: (accessed 10/8/2008).

²⁸Sergei Lavrov, "Transcript of Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Foreign Ministry's MGIMO University on the Occasion of the New Academic Year, September 1, 2008," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation* (September 1, 2008), cited

The one-sided reaction to the crisis in the Caucasus seemed to confirm the worst Russian fears about US and Western foreign policy ambitions. Western media outlets, according to Lavrov, had ignored all evidence of Georgian aggression and ethnic cleansing and framed the entire event as Russian aggression when, in reality, "Russia has become the first state to uphold such new principles as human security and the responsibility to protect, not in violation, but on the basis of international law."²⁹

Russia's response would be to seek a "truly universal system of collective security in EuroAtlantic" in which "the same rules of the game would apply to all... ensuring that no country could enhance its own security at the expense of another's. It would prohibit any military alliance or coalition from acting in a way that would weaken the overall structure. It would state that no single member or international organization would have the exclusive job of maintaining regional stability- including Russia."³⁰ Over the longer term, however, Russia would need more than formal agreements—it would seek a meeting of the minds or, as Lavrov puts it, "a common vision of our historical epoch."³¹

What will Russia do if it cannot get such a common vision? According to Lavrov, it will simply "step aside." "Under no circumstances will we let ourselves be drawn into confrontation. We will simply step aside, take up the position of a detached observer and continue to cooperate in a multilateral format if our bilateral relations with this or that country reach the freezing point. Something like this is now taking place in our relations with Britain."³²

in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#166, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/4/2008).

²⁹Sergei Lavrov, "Face to Face with America: Between Non-Confrontation and Convergence." *Profil* (October 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2008-#190, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 1/21/2009). For a detailed discussion of Russia's legal position see Nicolai N. Petro, "The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia," *Fordham International Law Journal*, vol. 32, Issue 5 (May 2009), pp. 1524-1549.

³⁰Sergei Lavrov, "Forging a New Partnership: Russia and the United States must work together in a multipolar world," *Newsweek* (December 31, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#4, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 2/2/2009).

³¹Sergei Lavrov, "Lavrov Views Global Threats, Challenges, Urges 'Broad Multilateral Cooperation'," *Izvestia* (April 30, 2007), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2007-#100, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 5/4/2007); Sergei Lavrov, "Russia and The United States: Between The Past and The Future," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia* (September 25, 2006), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2006-#216, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 10/3/2006).

³²Sergei Lavrov, "Face to Face with America: Between Non-Confrontation and Convergence," *Profil* (October 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2008-#190, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 1/21/2009).



Conducting affairs on the basis of strict reciprocity would not be Russia's preferred course. After all, says Lavrov, Russians and Americans share many values that stem from a common Christian heritage. "But," he concludes, "if our marriages are to be made in heaven, sooner or later we will have to unite in the face of common challenges and threats on the sinful soil of our national interests."³³

3.2 Operation "Reset"

For Russia the question, ultimately, is whether the United States has any real intention of ever "marrying" Russia. Until now, to follow Lavrov's analogy, it has been quite content with a relationship of "one night stands," so long as these are arranged at America's convenience and with no strings attached.

America's answer to Lavrov's challenge to "unite... on the sinful soil of our national interest" came, rather unexpectedly, from Vice President Joseph Biden. During his own speech to the Munich Security conference in February 2009, Biden said "it's time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia."³⁴ From now on the United States would cooperate with Russia in forging a common approach to international security despite the fact that there was still no meeting of the minds on values.³⁵

As a sign of good faith, Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO were taken off the table, the issue of whom to blame for the crisis in the Caucasus was quietly swept under the rug (for about a year Georgia was denied U.S. military assistance), and the United States suspended a decade-long plan to build a missile defense shield in Central Europe.

Both sides have credited the reset for dramatically expanding areas of cooperation. In 2010 alone it resulted in a new START Treaty; a new agreement to work cooperatively on building an AMD system for Europe; the

³³Sergei Lavrov, "A Roadmap to Cooperation," *Russia Beyond the Headlines* (<http://www.rbth.ru>) (May, 28 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2008-#105, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 5/29/2008).

³⁴"Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy," *White House Office of the Press Secretary* (February 7, 2009), available online at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksbyVicePresidentBidenat45thMunichConferenceonSecuri> (accessed 1/23/2011).

³⁵Nicolai N. Petro, "Mired in a Yawning Divide," *The Moscow Times* (July 13, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#131, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 7/29/2009).

cessation of Russian sales of all weapons to Iran; the expansion of transit rights through Russian territory for NATO troops headed for Afghanistan; close cooperation in responding to the succession crisis in Kyrgyzstan, and a dramatic expansion of commercial energy ties. It must be pointed out, however, that many of these are not new initiatives, but rather the resumption of previously negotiated agreements that had been suspended.

In the case of Iran, for example, Russia had already joined in UN economic sanctions back in May 2008, leading former president Bush to refer to Iran as an "area of common ground between Russia and the United States."³⁶ We also know, from U.S. government cables released by Wikileaks, that the United States and Russia have been sharing intelligence on Iranian and North Korean missile capabilities for quite some time.³⁷ Concern about terrorist safe havens has also led to unpublicized cooperation between Russia and the United States in maintaining stability in Georgia, Azerbaijan and, most recently, Kyrgyzstan.³⁸

As early as 2006, British newspapers reported that the U.S. was trying to entice Russia with arms deals in Afghanistan, although the first major contract between the U.S. Defense Department and Rosoboronexport, for the supply of military transport helicopters, was only signed in May 2011.³⁹ In

³⁶"Russia joins U.N. economic sanctions on Iran," *Reuters* (May 8, 2008), available online at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0891509220080508>> (accessed 5/8/2008); Ned Temko, "Interview of the President by Ned Temko of the Observer," *US White House* (June 13, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2008-#116, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 6/16/2008).

³⁷Owen Matthews, "The Enemy of My Frenemy ...," *Newsweek* (November 30, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.newsweek.com/2010/11/30/what-wikileaks-docs-reveal-about-the-iran-threat.print.html>> (accessed 12/1/2010).

³⁸Vladimir Perekrest, "U.S. Helped Basayev Elimination Operation; Turkey, Georgia Took Part," *Izvestia* (July 13, 2006), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2006-#159, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/1/2006); Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Caucasus: Russia, U.S. Played Key Role As Events in Georgia, Azerbaijan Unfolded," *RFE/RL* (11 December 2003), cited in Johnson's Russia List #7465, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 7/20/2006); "Russia Plunges Into Georgia Crisis As Shevardnadze Fights for Survival," *Agence France Presse* (November 23, 2003), cited in Johnson's Russia List #7433, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 7/19/2006); Burt Herman, "U.S., Russia Teamed Up on Georgia Crisis," *AP* (November 24, 2003), cited in Johnson's Russia List #7435, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 7/19/2006); "U.S. Asked Russia to Send Troops to Kyrgyzstan At Height of Rioting," *Interfax* (September 6, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#171, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/20/2010).

³⁹Thomas Harding, "U.S. Sets Up [L] 215m Deal for Afghan Arms - From Russia," *Daily Telegraph* (UK) (May 22, 2006), available online at: <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/05/22/warms22.xml>> (ac-

2009 Russia dramatically expanded NATO overflight access over Russia by permitting up to 4,500 flights as well as 5,000 or 6,000 cargo containers to head for Afghanistan.⁴⁰ For its part, Russia has not stood by waiting for Western initiatives. It has submitted a formal draft of a European Security Treaty, seeking to broaden the involvement of pan-European institutions in the resolution of regional conflicts.⁴¹

Russia has also requested a formal mechanism for Russian participation in the European Union committee that is responsible for foreign policy,⁴² and approached NATO with the idea of reanimating the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.⁴³ Perhaps most startling of all, Alexander Kramarenko, the director of the policy planning department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, recently welcomed Russia and NATO working together to forge a "global security web," adding that "if NATO invites Russia to join, it will be difficult to decline."⁴⁴

cessed 11/30/2006); "U.S.-Russian Helicopter Deal Major Boost For Afghan Army – Kremlin," *Interfax* (May 28, 2011), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2011-#93, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 6/01/2011).

⁴⁰United States-Russia Military Transit Agreement," *The White House* (July 6, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#126, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 7/29/2009); M. K. Bhadrakumar, "NATO invites Russia to join Afghan fray," *Asia Time* (October 28, 2010), available online at: <http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LJ28Ag01.html> (accessed 10/29/2010); Kim Sengupta, "Afghanistan: Russia steps in to help Nato," *The Independent* (October 27, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#202, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 10/28/2010); Yulia Krivoshapko, "Afghani tranzit," *Izvestia* (November 30, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#222, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 12/3/2010).

⁴¹The treaty would oblige nations to pursue "indivisible, equal and undiminished security" (Art. 1) by positively affirming their obligation to take no action "significantly affecting" the security of another member (Art. 2), to act transparently (Art. 3), and to engage in specific conflict resolution mechanisms (Art. 4) which will ultimately be legally binding (Art. 6, Art. 8). "The draft of the European Security Treaty has been published," *www.kremlin.ru* (November 29, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#219, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 12/1/2009).

⁴²Judy Dempsey, "Russia Wants to Formalize Relation With E.U.," *New York Times* (October 18, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#195, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 10/19/2010).

⁴³Alexander Gabuyev, "Moscow suggested reanimation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty," *Kommersant* (March 15, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#51, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 3/16/2010).

⁴⁴Alexander Kramarenko, "5 Reasons Why Russia Could Join NATO," *Moscow Times* (December 9, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#228, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 1/21/2011).

3.3 Russian Foreign Policy Through the Energy Looking Glass

By assuaging Russia's fear of being isolated and misunderstood, the reset has also allowed Russian foreign policy decision-makers to focus greater attention on their longer term agenda of creating a new, more equitable international order, which were temporarily derailed in the aftermath of the crisis in the Caucasus. It has also led to a growing realization that any leverage Russia may have in forging such a system comes from its unique status as an energy superpower. As a result, Russia increasingly treats energy as its central security and foreign policy asset and instrument.

The resolution in 2010 of the forty year old border dispute with Norway over the borders of Europe's northern continental shelf highlights the singular importance of energy exploitation for Russian foreign policy. By splitting the contested territory between them Russia and Norway, the only two major European energy suppliers that have refused to sign the European Energy Charter, have paved the way for joint commercial exploitation of the Barents Sea.⁴⁵

This settlement also helped to cement the landmark USD 16 billion share swap between Rosneft and BP in January 2011, which was to establish the world's leading Arctic research consortium. Much of the oil and gas from the Arctic will eventually go to the U. S., where Russia already supplies roughly 10 percent of total electricity demand.⁴⁶ These steps are all part of a

⁴⁵Dieter Helm, "Russia's Energy Policy: Political Assertiveness Or Rational Economics?" *Opendemocracy.net* (October 17, 2006), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2006-#234, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 10/18/2006); Elena Shishkunova, "Russia's Oil and Gas Future in State Hands," *Izvestia* (December 20, 2006), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2006-#286, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 12/24/2006). According to Shishkunova, "By contrast with Norway, Russia's oil and gas policies are a model of market liberalism," a point reinforced by the Norwegian government's decision to merge the two largest state companies--Norsk Hydro and Statoil, compared to recent Russia moves in the opposite direction. See "Russian Ministry Calls For Strategic Resource Liberalization, Global Expertise," *Interfax* (September 16, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#176, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/20/2010).

⁴⁶Guy Faulconbridge and Melissa Akin, "Russian oil tsar Sechin goes global with BP deal," *Reuters* (January 17, 2011), available online at: <<http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE70GoL220110117?sp=true>> (accessed 1/17/2011); "123 Agreement Promotes US-Russia Nuclear Cooperation," *Vedomosti* (January 13, 2011), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2011-#11, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 1/21/2011); Andrew Kramer, "Power for U.S. From Russia's Old Nuclear Weapons," *New York Times* (November 10, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#205, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 11/10/2009); Eben Harrell, "Turning Russian Nukes into U.S. Energy," *Time* (September 11, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2017465,00.html>> (accessed 9/13/2010).

strategy designed to place Russia well ahead of any other nation in the exploitation of Arctic resources.

No less impressive has been the expansion of energy ties with China. Analysts predict that over the next two decades Southeast Asia's energy demand will grow seven times faster than demand in Europe and the Americas and, thanks to an agreement signed at the end of 2010, Russia will supply up to 4% of China's rapidly growing energy demand, in exchange for which China will invest 25 billion in Russian oil companies.⁴⁷

Russia believes that, in the future, Russia and other developing markets will become more attractive partners for China than either the US or Europe. First, because the former are a better ideological fit. Second, because that is where the resources are that China needs to grow. Finally, because, as their economies become wealthier by selling resources to China, they will in turn import more Chinese products. Russia is therefore pursuing a multi-faceted expansion of ties with China—diplomatic, cultural, economic—but at their center will be economic and energy interdependence.⁴⁸

4 Phase Three: Beyond Reset—Pax Medvedica?

So what lies beyond the reset? President Medvedev provided a glimpse in a foreign policy speech he gave in July 2010.⁴⁹ "It is in the interests of Russian democracy," Medvedev said, "for as many nations as possible to follow democratic standards, [but] such standards should be developed jointly, taking into account the views of all."

⁴⁷Howard Amos, "Oil and Gas Head Up and East," *Moscow Times* (January 18, 2011), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2011-#12, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 1/21/2011); Gerald Hosp, "Russisches Oel stroemt nach China," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany)* (December 29, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.inosmi.ru/economic/20101229/165296873.html>> (accessed 12/29/2010).

⁴⁸Su Qiang and Li Xiaokun, "China, Russia quit dollar," *ChinaDaily.com (China)* (November 24, 2010), available online at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/24/content_11599087.htm> (accessed 11/30/2010); Elena Kukol, "Khoroshaya para," *Rossiiskaya gazeta* (December 15, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/12/15/uanj-site.html>> (accessed 12/15/2010); "Russian foreign minister hails new arms treaty on eve of signing - full text," *BBC Monitoring* (April 6, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#67, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 4/9/2010).

⁴⁹"Speech at meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organisations," *Kremlin.Ru* (July 12, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#135, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 8/10/2010).

Echoing Putin's Munich speech, Medvedev said that Russia will insist on "fairer principles of cooperation, building relations between free nations on a solid foundation, and the firm principles of universal international law." But, in a new twist, Russia intends to establish "special modernisation alliances" with its main international partners—Germany, France, Italy, the European Union, and the United States. "Creating incentives for integration is based on shared modernisation imperatives," which is necessary to "confront the challenges common to us all, challenges that have no boundaries." Eventually, a similar relationship is envisioned with China and India.

With this speech Medvedev confirmed the authenticity of a classified memo, published by *Russian Newsweek* in May.⁵⁰ The article's catchy title – "Let the Sun Shine In"—is a bit too dramatic for its rather tedious description of how Russia might pursue cooperation with specific countries (options included: energy, science and technology, capital investment, transportation, military sales, industry, and security). More interesting than the contents of the memo was the introduction to it, written by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, which balances cautious optimism about global trends with a sense of their fragility.

Lavrov starts by blaming the global financial crisis on "the western-centric system of global management dominated by the USA". The dire state of the current global financial system, driven by "wild capitalism," shows that the current international order is fundamentally unstable.⁵¹ At the same time, however, he notes that the crisis has had a "leveling effect" by depriving some countries of the financial advantages they had built up over time. As a result, he concludes, global politics is now more regionalized, and this will determine the course of the next stage of globalization.

Washington's strategy for preserving global dominance is to promote U.S. economic linkage with China and thereby forge a hegemonic global duumvirate that can ignore international decision-making bodies. But, according to Lavrov, this agenda is causing friction with neo-conservatives who seek a return to the confrontational policies of the past. It is not yet clear if who will succeed in this struggle.

At the same time, however, the post-crisis political and economic environment is creating dramatic new opportunities for multipolar diplomacy. The main criteria for success in such an environment will be a country's ability of take into account the interests of the medium and small countries not represented in the G20 and other "exclusive clubs." Russia should actively

⁵⁰Gaaze and Zygar, "Pust' vseгда budet Solntse."

⁵¹The text actually says "liberal'ny kapitalizm," but in the next paragraph Lavrov defines liberalism as a state abandoning its responsibility for development.

support this by "strengthening mutually dependent relations with leading global and regional power through the interpenetration of economies and cultures, initiating external sources of [Russian] modernization through the establishment of 'modernization alliances,' [and] focusing attention on the objective competitive advantages created for all those who participants in the processes of integration."⁵²

An apt summary of the president's vision of the world was given by the his press secretary: "The world probably needs new rules, new schemes of interaction, and probably a new comprehension of the situation we're in, because there are no blocs now, no conflict between capitalist and socialist regimes, no ideological differences; there is one single common civilization" [emphasis added—np].⁵³ Former presidential advisor Gleb Pavlovsky put it even more succinctly: Pax Medvedica.⁵⁴

5 Conclusion

Although we do not know as yet who will be president of Russia after 2012, this uncertainty matters far less than in did in the past. The next president, whoever he is, will inherit a foreign policy agenda that is unlikely to change because it has the overwhelming support of Russia's financial and political elites.

Some see evidence of changes in Vladislav Surkov's recent public comments that "we hope that Russia will become one of the Western democracies," and his suggestion that the "new world order" involves the spread of "democratic procedures."⁵⁵ But Surkov's remarks, made several months before the onset of the Arab Spring, are no different from his remarks in 2006 when he called for a "just globalization and the democratization of international relations."⁵⁶ In the interim Russia's position has not changed, rather

⁵²Gaaze and Zygar, "Pust' vseгда budet Solntse."

⁵³"Modernization should change people's minds' presidential press secretary," *Russia Today* (May 10, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#91, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 6/4/2010).

⁵⁴Gleb Pavlovsky, "Pax Medvedica," *Russkiy zhurnal* (May 4, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print//Mirovaya-povestka/Pax-Medvedica>> (accessed 5/4/2010).

⁵⁵"Senior Kremlin official sees Russia's future among 'Western democracies,'" *RIA-Novosti* (November 18, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#217, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 11/23/2010).

⁵⁶Moreover, in a recent interview Surkov explicitly reiterated that democracy, individual rights, freedom, are all linked to the concept of sovereignty which "remains as before the hi-

its capacity to pursue its vision has expanded.

One should therefore resist the temptation to draw a sharp distinction between Medvedev and Putin, or to perceive them as pursuing divergent foreign policy agendas. It would be more accurate to see Medvedev's foreign policy as evolving out of Putin's. Incidentally, this view fits much better what is known about the personal and intellectual relationship that the two men share.⁵⁷ Their fundamental agreement on global trends highlights my point that there is now a stable consensus concerning the future direction of Russian foreign policy, one that the elites around Putin as well as the elites around Medvedev support. Since their "tandemocracy" has the support of at least 70% of the population, barring some unforeseeable catastrophe the broad outlines of Russian foreign policy appear to be set for quite some time.

At the heart of this consensus sits an urgency about strengthening global security (political, military, economic, environmental and energy) by dividing risk among stakeholders. Such stakeholders need not always be governments, but agreements on how to share risks should be undertaken by the largest number of significant political actors, and always with the blessing of the United Nations. For Russia, such "risk sharing" must become the new guiding principle in international relations. "It is essential" as Medvedev has said, "to find a new point for risk sharing because the risks are [now] so high."⁵⁸

Future policy debates may be about where to draw the line between national, regional, and international responsibility for assuming risks, but not on the desirability of doing so. A post-realist consensus has thus begun to take shape in Russia, which also explains the country's keen interest in combining energy security and interdependence.

Skeptics argue that the continued presence of Russian bases in the CIS

ghest value of the state." Vladislav Surkov, "My dolzhny gotovit'sya k budushchei voine," *Odnakoj.Ru*, #46 (62) (December 10, 2010), available online at: <<http://odnakoj.ru/magazine/intervqyu/surkov/>> (accessed 1/21/2011).

⁵⁷Anton Oleynik, "Medvedev/Putin's Common Vocabulary Seen Showing No Real Clashes Within Tandem," *Vedomosti* (July 22, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#140, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 8/10/2010); Gleb Pavlovsky, "Pavlovskiy Gives Favorable Review of Russian 'Tandem'," *Kreml.org* (May 19, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#98, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 7/29/2009); Elizabeth A. Wood, "Who Is the Real Leader of Russia?" *Alternet.org* (June 12, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2008-#114, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 6/13/2008).

⁵⁸Dmitry Medvedev, "Interviu amerikanskoj gazette 'Uoll-strit dzhornel,'" *Kremlin.Ru* (June 18, 2010), available online at: <<http://news.kremlin.ru/news/8093/print>> (accessed 6/20/2010).



casts doubt on Russia's commitment to globalism and multipolarity, but even the staunchest advocates of the post-realist consensus do not discount the need for military preparedness. For now, however, the extension of basing agreements with Armenia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan provide benefits to both Russia's national coffers and to regional stability by enhancing the overall security of the countries hosting them. That is how these agreements have been portrayed by local leaders, and even some Western analyst are beginning to see that, as Thomas Graham put it, "a robust Russian presence throughout the former Soviet space serves U.S. interests in building stable balances."⁵⁹

Over the course of the next few years, therefore, we are likely to intense debates over what sort of multipolar world order Russia should be pursuing. Should it be the kind in which the BRICS (a designation that now includes South Africa) form a separate power bloc, which will compete with rival power blocs for power, resources and influence?⁶⁰ Or will it be a more truly global vision of multipolarity, in which realist definitions of power give way to a "human security" agenda.⁶¹ The language used by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov or influential political analyst Sergei Karaganov is distinctly

⁵⁹Anvar Raimov, "Rossiya ostaetsya dya nas osnovnym partnerom," *Novye izvestia* (June 15, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.newizv.ru/print/128136/>> (accessed 6/15/2010); Anna Nemtsova, "'We'll Always Rely on Russia'," *Newsweek* (June 21, 2010), available online at: (accessed 6/22/2010); Glenn Kessler and Andrew Higgins, "Clinton: U.S. will give share of lucrative fuel contract to Kyrgyzstan," *Washington Post* (December 2, 2010); Andrei and Dmitri Trenin, "The Wider Implications Of The Russian-Armenian Defense Deal," *RFE/RL* (August 24, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#161, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/16/2010); Avet Demourian, "Russian base in Armenia to stay through 2044," *Associated Press* (August 20, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#158, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/16/2010); Stephen Castle, "Ukraine Leader Pushes Triangular Partnership," *New York Times* (November 23, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#219, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 11/23/2010); Fred Weir, "With Ukraine's blessing, Russia to beef up its Black Sea Fleet," *Christian Science Monitor* (October 25, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#201, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 10/28/2010); Pavel Dulman, "Nikto ne khochet pobezhdat'," *Rossiiskaya gazeta* (April 23, 2010), available online at: <<http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/04/23/geopolitika.html>> (accessed 4/22/2010); Thomas Graham, "U.S.-Russian Relations: Towards a Strategy beyond the Reset," *Expert* (September 6, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#174, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 9/21/2010).

⁶⁰"Per favorire la loro espansione, Cina e Russia chiamano il Sudafrica nel Bric," *AsiaNews.it* (January 5, 2011), available online at: <<http://www.asianews.it/notizie-it/Per-favorire-la-loro-espansione,-Cina-e-Russia-chiamano-il-Sudafrica>> (accessed 1/11/2011).

⁶¹Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).

reminiscent of the former, while the language of presidential advisors Gleb Pavlovsky or Igor Yurgens sounds much more like the latter. Russia's choice is likely to be significantly affected by how its foreign policy initiatives are received in the West.

Russia's recent decision to support limited military intervention on behalf of the civilian population in Libya gives us a glimpse of the constantly shifting balance between these two interpretations of multipolarity. Consistent with the priorities of Medvedev's foreign policy concept, Russia supported extensive intervention in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970, but drew the line at direct military intervention. It abstained from using its veto in on Resolution 1973 because it had apparently received assurances that military measures would be undertaken only to protect the civilian population.⁶²

But, as the objective of NATO's Libyan campaign has evolved from the protection of the civilian population into regime change, many senior officials—most notably Putin and Lavrov—have condemned this shift as a blatant violation of the intent of Resolution 1973. The course of events has lent credence to the skeptics' argument that the Western powers are not yet ready to embrace true multipolarity. In response, Medvedev has been forced to stress that his support for Western policies is conditional on their willingness to abide by their U.N. mandate. While this is a set back for rapprochement with the West, it may have inadvertently strengthened multipolarity by reinforcing Russia's ties with the BRICS and other major international actors.

Finally, having stressed the significance of energy in Russia's foreign policy strategy, it is appropriate to ask whether Russia's continued dependence on energy as an instrument of foreign policy creates structural impediments to the adoption of a more global—or, as the Russian Foreign Ministry calls it, "humanistic"—foreign policy agenda. Some analyst see democracy and resource wealth as fundamentally incompatible.⁶³ Others are not convinced.⁶⁴

⁶²"A Conversation with Sergey B. Ivanov," Council on Foreign Relation (April 4, 2011), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2011-#61, available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 5/25/2011).

⁶³Anders Aslund, "Why market reform succeeded and democracy failed in Russia," Social Research, Spring, 2009. Available online at: <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_1_76/ai_n32150805/pg_9/>.

⁶⁴Daniel Treisman, "Rethinking Russia : Is Russia Cursed by Oil?" *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2010 Page 85-102; Peter Rutland, "Can Russia Escape the Oil Curse (working draft)?" Available online at: <[prutland.web.wesleyan.edu/Documents/Resource%20curse.pdf](http://rutland.web.wesleyan.edu/Documents/Resource%20curse.pdf)>.

There is no need to pre-judge this issue. Far more important is understanding that Russia is already committed to breaking with a strict, nation-state conception of security and foreign policy interests, and to promoting a new, multipolar security architecture in which risk is far more broadly shared. It is within this context, therefore, that future relations with Russia are likely to yield the greatest benefits.

Recommended Reading

"Lavrov Calls To Draw Final Line Under Cold War." *Itar-Tass* (May 8, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#86. Available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 5/19/2009).

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"Russia, West Should Get Rid Of Cold War Stereotypes - Medvedev." *Itar-Tass* (September 18, 2009), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2009-#173. Available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 10/1/2009).

"Russian foreign minister says European security in 'deep crisis'." *RIA Novosti* (January 16, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2008-#12. Available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 1/20/2008).

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Bhadrakumar, M. K. "Russia 'on board', but not in line." *Asia Times* (February 17, 2010), cited in Johnson's Russia List #2010-#31. Available online at: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/>> (accessed 2/17/2010).

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