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*The quest for a “European strategic culture”
Different Approaches of Old and New Member States*

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ABSTRACT

The Iraqi war created a clash within the European Union between the so called “Old” and “New Europe”. This division was soon associated to another one, that between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists”. Many scholars tried to show that the enlargement process undermined EU capacity and political willingness to build its own “strategic culture”. New member States were too keen to recognize USA and NATO as the main guarantors of security in the Continent, while they constantly frustrated Old members attempts to build a stronger EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The aim of this paper is to show that there have always been different types of “strategic cultures” in Europe and that new Members’ alleged “Atlanticism” was not just an “anti-European” stance. On the contrary, it was a complementary step towards the creation of a more independent EU security capacity. Moreover, the enlargement process showed that the main rift between Old and New Member States had to be found on the Eastern border, rather than on the Western one. Central and Eastern European Countries’ dynamism towards EU eastern neighbours showed the attempt by new Members to shape the European “strategic culture”, by protecting their strategic interests in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Although the *European Neighbourhood Policy* as well as the *Eastern Partnership Initiative*, became sources of misunderstandings within EU Institutions, they showed how willing new comers were to contribute to enhancing EU security. Both *Transatlantic Trends* and *Eurobarometers* highlight that even the most traditionally enduring “Atlanticists” are becoming “Europeanized”, by advocating an increased “communitarian” approach to strengthen EU CFSP/CSDP effectiveness. In this sense, looking at both Polish and Lithuanian cases will allow us to realize that, despite persistent

scepticism, Central and Eastern European Countries cannot be considered anymore as “US Trojan Horses” in Europe. Therefore, only by including their projects and dynamic ideas in a reinvigorated debate over “European strategic culture”, this strategy will become common also in practice. EU must use its “holistic approach” to overcome domestic misunderstandings and divergences and build up a “strategic culture” whose pillars will be both collective decision-making process and shared goals.

This is the only recipe to create a new global equilibrium, based on a “concert of projects”, rather than on a potentially disruptive “balance of power”.

KEYWORDS

Strategic culture, Old and New Europe, EU enlargement, EU CFSP, Atlanticism, Europeanization, European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, European Security Strategy

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEE: Central and Eastern Europe
 CEECs: Central and Eastern European countries
 CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
 CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
 EaP: Eastern Partnership Initiative
 ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
 ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
 ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
 ESS: European Security Strategy
 NMS: New Member States
 PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
 SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyzes the evolution of the debate about the European “strategic culture”, with a focus on both Polish and Lithuanian perspectives. Up until today, a unitary definition of this theoretical model does not exist. Jack Snyder, a pioneer of the idea of “strategic culture”, defined it as “the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired [...] with regard to nuclear strategy” (Snyder 1977, 8). In such a confused framework, I will adopt the definition given by Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas. They argue that a “strategic culture is a number of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a given society that generate specific expectations about the respective community’s preferences and actions in security and defence policy”.¹

“Strategic culture” is nothing monolithic, since it constantly changes. Moreover, it is not true that EU and USA share the same strategic vision. On the contrary, after the Iraqi War, it was clear that a “transatlantic rift” had emerged within the Transatlantic community. Therefore, the first part of the paper will describe the deep differences between EU and US “strategic cultures”. Then, I will shift my attention on the echo that this ideological clash had within EU, especially because of the internal tensions linked to the enlargement process. It unveiled the presence of different “strategic cultures” among member States. In this respect, I will devote a significant attention to the long-lasting debate about “Europeanism” and “Atlanticism”, an old idea, which nurtured the discussion about “Old and New Europe divide”. Old member States, striving to create

¹ H. Biehl, B. Giegerich, A. Jonas (Eds.), *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Springer, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, vol.13, 2013

a stronger EU CFSP after the Balkan fiasco, defined new comers from the East as the “US Trojan Horses” in Europe. On the other hand, New member States (NMS) criticized big powers’ attempts to make “directoires”, by pursuing a “twin-track” strategy, based on the strengthening of both EU (in the economic field) and NATO (for security issues). Yet, CEECs “Atlanticism” was not “anti-European” but was rather aimed at being incorporated into a wider European discourse. Therefore, I will suggest that NMS should better be called “Atlanticists becoming Europeanized”. In this respect, their activism in the Eastern front, especially within ENP and EaP initiatives, shows their readiness to contribute to strengthen the debate about EU “strategic culture”.

The paper also considers the transformation of Polish and Lithuanian “strategic cultures” within the broader framework of EU CFSP/CSDP. Using an historical perspective, I will describe the evolution of the countries’ attitude towards EU security initiatives. As for Poland, despite Warsaw’s alleged “Atlanticism”, it effectively supported many EU-led military operations. Poland was one of the main sponsors of the ENP, as well as EaP and it gradually shifted from a traditional mistrust towards EU in security issues, to a much more constructive approach. The country adapted well to the CFSP, especially in terms of administrative and bureaucratic structures and it soon became one of the most vocal advocates of common European Union defence efforts. On the other side, Lithuanian “strategic culture”, gradually evolved from the mantra of ‘no duplication with NATO’ towards a new approach. The initial disillusionment for EU CFSP/CSDP, also due to the exclusion of Baltic interests and ideas in the forming of EU CFSP/CSDP, has been replaced by a new cooperative stance. Vilnius understood that, while a strong CFSP/CSDP would not kill transatlantic relations, on the other hand, a weak CFSP/CSDP would seriously undermine its security interests, especially in relation with Russia. Meanwhile, despite clear structural limitations, Lithuania’s contribution in EU-led external missions has significantly increased. Lithuania focused on niche capabilities like mine-clearing, medical support and border-management. Now, the main task for the EU is to provide Vilnius with the assurances that EU military standards will not be different than NATO ones and that armaments policies will be based not only

on competition, but rather on fruitful and pragmatic cooperation with Washington.

The debate about EU “strategic culture” has entered in a crucial phase. Internal (different “strategic cultures) and external (Iraqi War, Enlargement process, economic crisis) pressures made it clear that EU still has a long pace to walk before achieving a “common European strategic culture”. The very first step is to recognize that NMS must play a new role within this ambitious project. They are willing to strengthen EU CFSP/CSDP. Therefore, only by including them in such a debate, future EU common security strategies will become common also in practice. However, the glass is half-full. Despite internal divisions, EU managed to create a peaceful “holistic approach” towards the implementation of CSFP/CSDP. What it needs now, is to make this multilateral system more effective than in past. CEECs had already been excluded at the beginning of 2000s. Now, in a new enlarged Europe, time is ready to give them the possibility to be finally treated as equal partners.

IRAQI WAR: THE EMERGENCE OF “OLD AND NEW EUROPE”

American unilateralist intervention in Iraq had dramatic consequences in the process of European integration. Many scholars in those years claimed that the internal European dispute over Iraq marked one of the lowest points in continental integration process. Some policy makers (notably in France), even saw the crisis as the ultimate proof that enlargement was incompatible with a stronger and more independent European Union.

For this reason, some analysts started talking about the clash between “Old” and “New Europe”, that was between Old Member States and New, formerly communist, ones. This expression was not simply a curious way to describe the internal misunderstandings within the Union about intervention in the Iraqi War. On the contrary, it touched the very basis of both European and Transatlantic relations, showing the rift between “Europeanists” and “Atlanticists”. US Secretary of State Defence Donald Rumsfeld, was the first to give this definition. Responding to a reporter’s question on 22 January 2003 about “European” opposition to the use of force in Iraq (coming mainly from France and Germany), he distinguished between “Old” and “New Europe”². He thus underlined the contrast between the “apathy” of Western European States, with the vitality of the “new” Europe.

Different approaches of European states to transatlantic relations were always present, even during the Cold War. In this sense, some authors such as Laughland even argued that the “Old-New Europe”

² Asked at a press conference on 22 January 2002 to assess the behaviour of France and Germany over the Iraq crisis Rumsfeld said: “That’s Old Europe. I fyou look at the entire NATO Europe today, the centre for gravity is shifting to the East”

idea had already entered in the European political debate during the second half of the 19th century. Precisely, it was used to present the gap between “old, feudal and cosmopolitan European order and the new emerging forces of nationalism, industrialization and modernization”.³ During the Cold War this label acquired a different meaning. It was indeed used to underline that, while some countries in Western Europe strongly contested the leadership role of the USA, on the other hand, the need to strengthen the transatlantic unity was much more evident in liberal and dissident groups in Eastern Europe⁴.

These differences became much more distinct with the end of the bipolar confrontation. Some states, like France, openly questioned the need to maintain strong transatlantic ties in security issues. On the other side, other countries like Britain, strongly tried to protect the status quo. London was joined in this effort by former Soviet-bloc CEECs like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which became enthusiastic supporters of Washington and NATO expansion eastwards.⁵ There were historical reasons behind this attitude. Many countries in CEE (mainly Poland and Czechoslovakia), were re-established thanks to the US after the First World War. Furthermore, Washington always rejected to accept the inclusion of the Baltic States within Soviet Union. Moreover, it was commonly believed that the Yugoslav wars were stopped only after US intervention. Finally, the American presence in Europe was welcomed as the best way to impede the revival of Russian expansionistic policies in the area.

Geographical size mattered a lot in security issues, especially for

3 J. Laughland “The tainted source: the Undemocratic Origins of the European idea”, Warner Books, London, 1998 quoted in J.Sedivy and Marcin Zaborowski: “Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic relations”, in *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, edited by K. Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group London and New York, 2005, p.18

4 J.Sedivy and Marcin Zaborowski: “Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic relations”, in *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, edited by K. Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group London and New York, 2005

5 Bezen Balamir Coskun “Does Strategic culture matter? Old Europe, New Europe and transatlantic security”, *Perceptions*, 2007, Autumn-Summer, pp.71-90

the “New Europeans”. Except for Poland, all the newcomers were small States; therefore, they tried to defend their position vis-à-vis bigger members. There had always been two existential needs in CEE: security and economic development. Security meant not only protection against the traditional aggressor in the region (Russia), but also the effort to impede that the EU could become “a Diréctoire” dominated by bigger States. In this context of rising mistrust, the Elysée Summit held in January 2003 between France and Germany was perceived as an attempt by Berlin and Paris to speak on behalf of Europe against the USA. In addition to that, the possible inclusion of Russia into a new European architecture to counterbalance Washington, was considered as a potentially disruptive scenario. In this sense, when Moscow was invited to join France and Germany at a triangular summit in St. Petersburg in February 2003, the “old specter of a Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok (with Russia but without Washington) revived old fears in CEE”⁶.

Yet, during the Iraqi War, very few policy-makers believed that Berlin, Paris or even Brussels, could provide Continental security; only Washington could.⁷ For this reason, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland together with Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Britain signed the “Letter of Eight” to call for European unity in the Security Council on the enforcement of Resolution 1441. Furthermore, ten CEECs, the “Vilnius Ten”, issued another letter to support the US. These two meetings, indeed, did show that 18 European countries from “A” like Albania to “S” like Slovenia were not ready neither to abandon the “hyperpower” nor to submit to the French-German axis.⁸

Despite these events seemed to be a confirmation of Rumsfeld statement, the “Old-New Europe” dichotomy seems to be too simplistic, since it does not take into account the presence of internal divisions among these two blocs, as well as their mutual

6 Dr Szamuely “The myth of a single European view: Old Europe and New”, <http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/international.live?article=145>

7 M. Radu E-Notes (12th March 2003) “Old Europe vs New”, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030312.radu.oldeuropevsnew.html>

8 J. Joffe “Continental divides”, *The National Interest*, Spring 2003, vol. 71, pp.157-160

commitment to the strengthening of European external capacity. US unilateral “exportation of democracy” in the Middle east soon raised doubts and criticism in the European public space. In particular it showed the presence of a big rift between European and American “strategic cultures”.

EUROPEAN AND US STRATEGIC CULTURES

After the collapse of Communism, deep differences emerged between US and European ways of looking at their respective “strategic cultures”. Why are American and European “strategic cultures” so different?

A difference lies in the opposed description of the end of the Cold War.⁹ Many Europeans questioned the one-sided triumphalistic approach of American sovietologists. This created a growing “transatlantic split” with the European scholars calling for a new multi-dimensional approach.¹⁰ This cultural incongruence produced different attitudes even towards the notion of collective security and multilateralism. While this idea had a positive connotation in Brussels, Washington showed a much more ambivalent attitude. USA were still in between the modern system of sovereign States and the post-modern community of States. Europe on the other hand, with its preference for collective action and international regimes, was strongly a post-modern entity.¹¹

Despite the terrorist attacks of 9/11 immediately raised an unprecedented wave of European solidarity with the US, President Bush decision to wage a war against Iraq made the transatlantic

9 J. Rubenfeld “Two world orders”, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 2003, pp. 22-36.

10 M. Cox “Another Transatlantic split? American and European narratives and the end of the Cold War”, *Cold War History*, February 2007, vol.7, no. 1, pp. 121-146

11 R. Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century*, Grove press, New York, 2003

gap grow further and further. Some analysts such as Heisburg, even interpreted it as the end of the West as a political and security construct.¹² Others, like Rita di Leo talked about the so called “Atlantic rift” in EU-US relations. Robert Kagan tried to explain the “Transatlantic split” in his seminal essay and book *Paradise and Power: “Europe is moving into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and co-operation. Meanwhile, the USA remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable”*¹³.

Europe needed multilateral institutions to compensate for its relative weakness, while US greater power pushed them to see multilateral organizations as an obstacle, rather than an opportunity. On the contrary, Europeans were proud to claim that they managed to create a specific type of “security community” which looked at war as a political failure, rather than as the continuation of diplomacy by other means (Sedivy and Zaborovski 2005, 10). In other words, following Deutsch ideas, Europe elaborated a new sense of “we-ness”, a community of States which were so much integrated to agree on the need to settle both internal and external disputes by peaceful means (Flockart 2005, 8).¹⁴ In this sense, the war in Iraq provided the occasion for some of the most original initiatives aimed at re-imagining the European space together with Europe’s political and security role. Re-imagining meant also “imagining a different modernity, a different West”, which was radically different from the essentialist fundamentalism that had come to dominate mainstream US politics.¹⁵ The “transatlantic split” was a “battle of ideas” which provoked a clash between decision and mediation, between a “power identity” (conceived as bounded

12 A.D. Rotfled, “How should Europe respond to the new America”, *Prospect*, April 2003

13 R. Kagan, *Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Atlantic books, London, 2003 p.3

14 T. Flockart, *Socializing Democratic Norms The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005

15 L. Bialasiewicz and C. Minca, “Old Europe, new Europe: for a geopolitics of translation”, *Area*, 2005, vol.37, no.4, pp. 365-372



and defined in the American neo-conservative rhetoric) against a “plural European subject” (L. Bialasiewicz and C. Minca 2005, 367). In many US conservative and realist narratives, Europe figured as a heavily feminized subject, weak and hesitant, unwilling to commit itself to action, privileging (empty) rhetoric over military strength, ambivalent and loath to take a strongly moral stance. Decisive action and bombs were thus inscribed as the grammar of virile identity, while diplomacy and dialectic were the attributes of the weak, ‘post-modern’ self (ibid., 367). Europe could not accept this brutal conception so it worked in order to “look ahead in Transatlantic relations”.¹⁶ Its focus on multilateralism, regional co-operation as well as economic integration, was the only way to “restore trust and inspire hope among people throughout the world” (Prodi 2003). However, despite of this common critical reaction to American unilateralism, it is possible to find significant differences between “Old” and “New Europe” strategic cultures. These are particularly evident if we look at the different attitudes towards transatlantic relations.

CEE BETWEEN NATO AND EU CFSP

EU has always tried to convey a specific image of itself, based on multilateralism, regional co-operation and peaceful and long-term solutions to conflicts. It is not by chance that many studies on the perception of the EU at the global level usually proposed some definitions of it as “normative area”, a “civilian power” or even “Scandinavia of the world”(Lucarelli 2013).¹⁷ However, at the beginning of 2000s, international law and multilateralism were not

16 R. Prodi, *Looking ahead in transatlantic relations*, Dinner at the Rayburn House with German Marshall Fund of the US, Washington June 24th 2003


17 S. Lucarelli, “Perceptions of the EU in International Institutions”, in K.E. Jorgensen and K.E. Laatikainen, *The Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions*, Routledge, New York, 2013, pp. 429-444

viewed in CEE as the best ways to build up a peaceful international system. This scepticism was highly affected by historical reasons. The UN had always proved incapable to influence the bipolar system of international relations. Therefore, when Communism collapsed, CEECs were keen to deal with a far way non-imperialistic liberal hegemonic country (Sedivy and Zaborovski 2005, 23). The enlargement process, brought into light these wide cultural differences within Europe. The first signal of this gap was CEE suspicion to strengthen EU CFSP, preferring the survival of NATO or at least of “nationalized” security policies (Sedivy and Zaborowski 2005, 4). NATO survival in particular played a fundamental role in this debate. At the beginning of the 1990s, some Western European countries (France and newly united Germany) realized that “the hour of Europe” had come and that it was necessary to give the then EC the military capabilities to become both an economic and a security actor. Other members, mainly UK, Spain, Italy and all former Soviet satellites (which envisaged to be part of both NATO and EC/EU) pursued not only the survival of the Organization, but above all its transformation into a both political and military forum, opened for new members. In other words, NATO was still perceived as the most important security institution in Europe. Meanwhile, it took Europeans more than a decade to digest the magnitude of the structural and ideological changes of the post-Cold War period. The events in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq demonstrated that the internal political divisions as well as the dependence on the American military power were slowing the emergence of a continental “strategic culture”.

Europe had always tried to find a *modus vivendi* between two different approaches: the need to have both an active European and transatlantic component for security.¹⁸ This trend was very evident in CEE. CEECs pursued the so called “twin-track strategy”, aimed at both EU and NATO membership. NATO offered “hard security” guarantees, while EU dealt mainly with “soft security” that was economic and social development of their domestic societies.¹⁹

18 S. Duke, *The elusive quest for European security*, Palgrave Macmillan Press, Oxford, 2000

19 K.Raik & T. Palosaari, *It's the Taking Part that Counts The new member states*



As Missiroli pointed out, they did not want to be forced to choose between Washington and Brussels on security issues.²⁰ This was the main reason for their cold reaction to the so called “Berlin Plus Agreements” and the *European Security Strategy* (ESS), which were launched in 2003 (thus before the first EU enlargement). As a matter of fact, they hardly understood EU CFSP rationale and, above all, feared that it could undermine NATO’s internal cohesion and, more generally, drive the Americans out of Europe (Missiroli 2004, 122). They did not want to barter CFSP with NATO membership. To some extent, they seemed quite receptive of Madeleine Albright “3 Ds” warnings (no duplication of EU/NATO Institutions; no decoupling from NATO; non discrimination towards non-member States). For this reason, they supported a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within or under the supervision of NATO, in accordance with the old Western European Union idea of a ‘European pillar’ inside the Alliance. Moreover, they were concerned about the possibility of a “twotier EU”, which could enable selected groups of States to pursue a “enhanced co-operation” on defence and military matters. “Pro-Atlantic” attitudes were also strengthened by some events. Firstly, the anxiety about being excluded from important political decisions, including foreign policy, security and defence. Then, the mistrust of some countries (especially France) which considered CEECs as “Trojan Horses” of USA in Europe provoked a growing disillusionment in Eastern European capital cities. Therefore, this mix of fears and mistrust, pushed new EU-members to feel insecure within the Continent. On the contrary, USA were seen as the only stable partner for security issues.

Yet, this approach has a methodological weakness. It is not able to show the deep internal differences among EU member States related to security. A deeper analysis would show that the “New European bloc” was less solid than expected. Public opinion polls in all CEECs highlighted the presence of a significant gap between *elites* and general public. In many countries, between 60 and 70 per

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adapt to EU foreign and security policy, The Finnish Institute of International affairs, Helsinki, 2004, pp.1-56

20 A. Missiroli “CEE between EU and NATO”, *Survival*, Winter 2004-2005, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 121-136

cent of the population opposed the Iraqi war, while *Transatlantic trends* underlined the a decline in the approval ratings of US foreign policy.²¹ This gap pushes us to share Coscun opinion that, despite propagandistic claims, “new Europe” was not simply “pro-USA”. On the contrary, it was experiencing a slow process of adjustment of its own “strategic culture”, aimed at adapting itself with the European one (Coskun 2007, 13). It is not by chance if, for almost a decade, the eight central European states that were admitted to the EU in May 2004 – plus Bulgaria and Romania – had already been engaged in peace-support operations, mainly in the Balkans. Starting in 1996, all CEECs sent forces to Bosnia as part of IFOR or its successor, SFOR. Romania and Slovenia participated in the Italian-led *Operation Alba* to stabilize Albania after its 1997 meltdown. (Missiroli 2004, 123). Moreover, since the “Berlin Plus Agreements” were launched, CEE supported EU-led military operations. In this sense, Missiroli stressed that CEE contribution to CFSP proved to be paradoxically much more flexible than that of Old EU member States. They were more willing than old ones to radically reform their military sectors especially through specialization, the complementation of other countries’ armed forces, and joint acquisitions. In particular, specialization and cooperation were the best recipes to utilize the limited resources as effectively as possible. The Czechs, for example, focused on developing nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination units; the Hungarians on engineering squads; and the Romanians on mountain light infantry. Such specialization was extremely important since the new EU members plus Bulgaria and Romania were in the process of overhauling and modernizing their military forces (Missiroli 2004,123-124).

Yet, NMS went on showing little enthusiasm towards closer CFSP integration. Their attitude towards it was neatly summed up in the comment “in principle yes, in detail no” (Raik & Palosaari 2004). In other words, they backed the development of the CFSP at a general level, but constructive attitudes tended to disappear when the question of reducing national powers of decision emerged – by abolishing veto rights, for example. Of course, a corresponding

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 21 “We still rather like the Americans”, *The Economist*, 1 February 2003, <http://www.economist.com/node/1560869>

attitude is no alien phenomenon among old members either. However, is it possible to find a stark division between “Europeanists” and “Atlanticists” in the EU?

A DIFFERENT ATLANTICISM: “ATLANTICIST BECOMING EUROPENIZED”

Some authors claim that CEE “Atlanticism” still represents the main obstacle towards the creation of a common “European strategic culture”. However, this conclusion is quite biased, since it does not take into account that CEECs pro – NATO orientation is completely different from the forms of “Atlanticism” we are used to cope with when we analyze the Cold War history.

CEE “Atlanticism” cannot be compared to that of some Old EU-member States such as UK. Firstly, CEE “Atlanticism” is not “anti-European” but rather is aimed at being incorporated into a wider European discourse (Raik & Palosaari 2004). Moreover, there are different “shades of Atlanticism” among the EU newcomers. In this special ranking Poland and the Baltic States are usually at the top; Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are somewhere in the middle, while Slovenia lies at the bottom of the list. These countries show different attitudes towards both the USA and the EU CFSP.

Some (mainly Poland and the Baltic States), always tried to make CFSP compatible with US policies, not only in terms of political EU-NATO relations, but also on other issues, such as policies towards Russia, the Ukraine, or the Black Sea region.

Their main priorities were:

- strengthening EU external action in the East;
- finding a common EU stance towards Russia;
- offering incentives to support Ukraine pro-European path chosen during the Orange Revolution;
- encouraging democratic changes in other parts of former Soviet Union.

In order to achieve these goals, they chose the rhetoric of democracy (as opposed to authoritarian rule), rule of law and the right of countries to choose their own destiny as an integral part of their foreign policy activities²².


Other CEECs (mainly Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia) behaved in a completely different way. They did not perceive Russia neither as an external nor as a domestic threat. Their main target was represented by Western Balkans, whereas their Atlanticist commitment was not as equally intense as in the first group (siding with the US was not always the best solution).

Furthermore, this peculiar CEE “Atlanticism” does not mean automatic support for each and every American action or position on the international scene. Support to US policies is not unconditional. On the contrary, many US policies are perceived as somewhat controversial from the European perspective. In this sense, we cannot forget CEECs harsh critics towards US withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol, or during the controversy over the International Criminal Court. Therefore, they might be called “Atlanticists becoming Europeanized”. So, if from one side CEECs hope that, under the leadership of the United States, NATO would continue to carry the main responsibility for European security, they view the EU’s common security and defence policy as a better alternative to the so called “re-nationalization of defence” (Raik & Palosaari 2004, 17).

The best way to support this argument is to look at the so called *Transatlantic trends*. Even during the Iraqi war, an overwhelming majority of CEE populations opposed military intervention. In this sense, the NMS were not necessarily more Atlanticist than the old members. The thermometer readings highlighted that the “warmth” of feeling towards the US in Poland was 56°, but still lower than for instance in the UK (62°) or Italy (61°). Moreover, there was a five points decline since 2003. On the contrary, support to the EU steadily grew since the beginning of 2000s. For instance, feelings towards EU in Slovakia ranked much higher than France with a score of 72°. On the other side, data on Poland showed that Polish public

22 David Král, “Enlarging Eu Foreign Policy The Role Of The New EU Member States And Candidate Countries”, *EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy*, 2005, Praha

felt warmer towards the EU- 65° vs 56°- than the US (Kral 2005, 30).



Source: Transatlantic Trends Survey 2004

“NEW EUROPE” ACTIVISM: THE EASTERN DIMENSION OF THE ENP

In the previous pages we demonstrated that the “Atlanticist” argument is not the best way to explain the alleged “clash” between “Old and New Europe”. What really divides European States, is not the Atlantic front, but rather the Eastern one. In particular, division between old and new members is significant when it comes to Russia and other Eastern neighbours (Raki & Palosaari 2004).

Relations with Moscow matter a lot in undermining the possibility for EU to have a coherent and unique vision of a common “strategic

culture”. Since the very beginning of the enlargement process, the attitude of the CEECs has always been significantly more critical of Russian behaviour than that of not only Paris and Berlin, but also London and Rome (for instance on the Kaliningrad issue, the extension of PCA to Russia in 2004 or the need to have a EU response to Beslan massacre, etc.). Therefore, many CEECs tried to play a much more decisive role in EU eastern neighbourhood to avoid various threats, such as political and military conflicts, economic crises, cross-border crime, the drug trade, illegal immigration, nuclear material and environmental threats (Raik & Palosaari 2004). In this sense, CEE projects became another source of constant divergences within the EU. After the “Big Bang” many countries became the new external frontier of the EU. The permeability and safety of the eastern borders through neighbourhood policies thus emerged as a vital interest for many NMS. It shaped their overall behaviour inside the EU, not only regarding CFSP. The condition of national minorities, cross-border trade, visa regulations, energy and environmental issues, Balkan stability, relations with Belarus, Ukraine (a central Polish worry), Moldova (a key Romanian priority) and, of course, Russia were decisively put on the EU agenda (Missiroli 2004, 126). Therefore, it is through these lenses that we have to analyze the launching of the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP) as well as CEECs focus on its “Eastern Dimension”. They wanted to prevent the EU’s Eastern border from becoming a new iron curtain dividing Europe, so they focused on the promotion of Western values as well as the European integration of the Eastern neighbours. For instance, for Poland and the Baltic States, CIS countries became the main targets. This obviously implied clashes with Moscow. Eastern neighbourhood policy was indeed unambiguously regarded in the Kremlin as a counterbalancing policy in a strategic area. From this perspective the EU and the CIS were mutually exclusive and competitive options.

However, the ENP raised many critics within the academic debate. Firstly, after the latest enlargements, Europe and “EU-Europe” did not coincide yet. Moreover, the fact that the policy was applied to EU’s direct neighbours also in the South - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon was perceived as a big mistake. It was not possible and desirable to treat the southern and eastern neighbours as equal

cases. They had completely different geography and identities.²³ Therefore, the ENP did not create a homogeneous neighbourhood but rather a set of neighbours, which were extremely different from each another. In addition to that, there was a dangerous overlapping with other policies, such as those towards EFTA/EEA countries (Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein) which aimed at making a closer co-operation, but also enlargement policies towards the western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia).

ENP thus undermined EU attempts to develop a new “strategic culture for the enlarged Europe” to be exported to Eastern neighbours. It was never a single policy but rather an umbrella that brought together pre-existing Community funds and tried to give them a common rationale.²⁴ In this context, the rejection by Moscow to be included in the initiative meant that the main “neighbour” of the EU, was not included into this new “East-West” dialogue.²⁵

Nevertheless, the ENP biggest failure was that all member States were looking at it with different lenses and aimed at achieving different results. Germany focused mainly on free trade with ENP countries, visa exemptions, stronger cooperation on energy issues, immigration control, fight against organized crime, strengthening of sectors such as good governance, rule of law, justice, internal security, transport and environment. France was willing to develop the ENP in terms of energy supplies, migration control or fight against crime. The United Kingdom saw ENP mainly as a tool for fighting against terrorism. Finally, Poland promoted the establishment of a community of values and strengthening of civil society contacts (Łapczyński 2009).

For these reasons, many policy-makers both in Western

²³ Marcin Łapczyński, The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances And Perspectives, *Caucasian Review Of International Affairs*, Spring 2009, Vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 143-155

²⁴ A. Missiroli “The ENP three years on, where from where next?”, *Institute Du Développement Durable Et Des Relations Internationales*, Gouvernance Mondiale, 2007, no. 03, pp.1-6

²⁵ L. Karabeshkin, “New neighbours, common neighbours”, Conference Report on “Poland, Germany and its Eastern neighbours in the context of EU’s New Neighbourhood Policy” 3rd December 2004

and Eastern Europe, called for a wider diversification of EU neighbourhood policies towards the southern and eastern borders. That is why France elaborated the idea of the *Mediterranean Union*, while the Polish and Swedish ministers of foreign affairs Radosław Sikorski and Carl Bildt launched the *Eastern Partnership Initiative* (EaP). In this sense, the need to make European Eastern Dimension more effective reflected once again the attempt of CEE to shape “European strategic culture” by strengthening EU external capacity on the Eastern border.

THE DEBATE ABOUT CEE ROLE IN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

Launched in 2009, the EaP was another demonstration of the dynamism of NMS. To some extent, it confirmed US neoconservative idea that “Europe was shifting more and more to the East” (Rumsfeld 2003).

The EaP was conceived as a complementary part of a broader set of initiatives which included both *Black Sea Synergy* and the *Northern Dimension*. It was clear that the launching of the initiative was aimed at paving the way for the future admission of EU’s Eastern neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), by helping them in their democratic transitions and in the implementation of domestic reforms (Łapczyński 2009).

The main areas of co-operation were:

- Immigration with a strong focus on free visa regime as the long-term goal;
- Free trade area which had to take inspiration from the European Economic Area through the creation of a Neighbourhood Economic Community;
- Promoting civil society, through the *Civil Society Forum*
- Equitable distribution of assistance funds

Yet, EaP caused as many critics as ENP. Some authors saw in it a useless initiative, a duplication of already existing mechanisms. Other experts pointed out that EaP was the symbol of the “power struggle between Sarkozy and Tusk”, or rather “Old Europe” versus “New Europe” as the project was supposed to be a Polish answer to French *Mediterranean Union* and his plans to move more funds towards the Union’s southern neighbours.²⁶ Furthermore, the EaP was criticized because of its little capacity to stimulate change in Eastern Europe. In this sense, it offered too little to the more advanced countries (such as Ukraine and Georgia) in terms of democracy and alignment with the EU, but also too much to those with any political reform achievements (such as Azerbaijan and Belarus)²⁷. Democracy did not advance in the area. On the contrary, authoritarian neighbours persisted, while recently established electoral democracies were too much fragile also because of the lack of significant structural reforms²⁸.

Table 1. Dynamics of democratic performance of EaP countries in 2005-2008

Country	Democracy (overall)	Electoral process	Civil society	Independent media	National democratic governance	Local democratic governance	Judiciary	Corruption
Armenia	↓	0	↓	↓	↓	0	↓	↑
Azerbaijan	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	0	↓
Belarus	↑	↑	↑	0	↑	↓	0	↑
Georgia	↓	↓	↓	0	↓	↑	0	↑
Moldova	↓	0	↑	↓	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	↓	↓	0	↑	↓	0	↓	0

Source: Based on the scores of the Freedom House 'Nations in Transit' surveys 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.

↓ Deteriorated ↑ Improved 0 No change

26 I. Klinke, “The European Union’s Strategic Non-Engagement in Belarus. Challenging the Hegemonic Notion of the EU as a Toothless Value Diffuser,” *Perspectives. The Central European Review of International Affairs*, 2007, vol. 27, pp.23-43

27 J Boonstra & N. Shapovalova *The EU's EaP one year backwards*, FRIDE, May 2010, Working Paper 99, pp.1-22

28 <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2009?page=363&year=2009>

In this sense, a key problem was represented by “EU incentives”. They seemed to be too low while costs for domestic reforms were too high. This did not stimulate CEECs to strengthen cooperation with the EU at the expense of traditional foreign policy alliances. In addition to that, the *conditionality principle* was perceived as a form of unequal partnership, as one side dictates conditions and assesses their implementation by the other side. EaP even introduced a kind of “multilateral track” in order to have a “stick” to use against reluctant countries to increase *consistency* of conditionality principle. This implied the creation of a ‘relatively simple operational structure’ for high-level political support through a number of experts.²⁹ In this context, the involvement of non-state actors, gave the multilateral track activities the chance to open up a number of channels for socialization and social learning. EaP managed to single out the region from the rest of the ENP, offering an opportunity of integration to countries with a common history. However, these new actors were not provided with an equal status at both national and regional levels (J Boonstra & N. Shapovalova, 2010, 7).

To conclude, the EaP was another attempt by NMS to show that the creation of a new “European strategic culture” could not put aside their interests and ambitions. In this sense, the Eastern Neighbourhood played a pivotal role. CEECs had already been excluded during the debate about EU CFSP at the turnoff the millennium. Now, in a new enlarged Europe, time was ripe to give them the possibility to be treated as equal partners in order to contribute to the evolution of this complex but ambitious idea. Yet, EaP was not a great success. It did not overcome the weakness of the ENP in transforming the EU’s Eastern neighbours. EU’s offers were too distant and vague to push the partners to start radical domestic reforms. Many promises lacked concrete substance. Thus, the gap between the institutions and policies of the EU27 (now 28) and the EaP6 remained huge. In addition to that, EU policy effectiveness and credibility in the region was hindered by the inconsistent application of conditionality. On the contrary, democratization trends catalyzed

29 P. Kratochvíl, *Evaluating the Multilateral Framework of the Eastern Partnership*, Institute of International Relations in Prague, January 2010

by the coloured revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine began to revert during the past few years. Finally, regional cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood was (and is) constantly hampered by difficult political relations between neighbours and regional actors, territorial conflicts and, in some cases, physical barriers.

Table 3. The multilateral track

EaP Summit Every 2 years EU 27 and EaP 6 plus EU Institutions and IFIs as observers			
Ministerial Council Every year			
Policy (thematic) platforms Biannual meetings Working panels More frequent meetings			
Democracy, good governance and stability	Economic integration and convergence with EU policies	Energy security	Contacts between people
The flagship initiatives 1. Integrated Border Management (IBM) 2. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) 3. Regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy 4. Diversification of energy supply (<i>Not launched as of April 2010</i>) 5. Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters (PPRD) 6. Environmental governance			
Additional and non-governmental initiatives			
Civil Society Forum	Parliamentary dimension (EURONEST)	CoR's proposal for a Local and Regional Assembly	

(Source: J Boonstra & N. Shapovalova "The EU's EaP one year backwards", FRIDE, May 2010 Working Paper 99, p.8)

THE LISBON TREATY: A NEW FRONTIER FOR NEW EUROPE

In the path towards the creation of a "European strategic culture" an important step was represented by the Lisbon Treaty. Despite the fears of some Constitutional Courts that the Treaty could create some problems of adjustment of national law to the European provisions, by fall 2009 all EU members States signed and ratified it. However, some key ideas emerged during the ratification process within CEECs.

A study from Comenius University in Slovakia in 2010 shows that size matters a lot in EU even for legal provisions. Citizens in smaller countries believe in the benefits of EU membership more than citizens of larger countries do. However, despite the strong general support for integration, the majority of NMS also manifested some reservations about the deepening of integration in the area of social policies, tax harmonization, some aspects of justice and home affairs, but also education, culture or ethics.³⁰ Furthermore, another crucial part of the ratification process was the issue of the partition of "structural funds". Many NMS clearly articulated that their support for the Lisbon Treaty was conditional on negotiations regarding the EU's financial perspective.

The report also showed that the average support for the Council decisions by all 27 EU member states was 93.7 per cent (calculated only on the basis of those instances of voting when at least one member state did not support the measure). Among the NMS, only two (Poland and Lithuania) "scored" below the average of the

30 D. Malová, M. Rybář, V. Bilčík, E. Láštík, Z. Lisoňová, M. Mišík a M. Pašiak, *New Member States in the EU: From Listening to Action?*, Political Science Department, Comenius University, Slovakia, June 2010

EU-27. Yet, if we look at the old 15 EU member States we would realize that ten “scored” below the EU average, too. However, CEECs proved to be more supportive of the Council decisions than the old EU-15 countries. Nevertheless, many NMS pointed out the problem of “insufficient representation” of NMS in the European institutions which risked to undermine the ability to upload their proposals and preferences to the EU level. Preferences and strategies were still different, also in EU CFSP.

In this issue, the authors of the study underline the presence of three main security priorities:

- Energy security: need to increase co-operation and integration in energy policy at the EU level in order to achieve independent, sufficient and steady supplies of energy.
- Transatlantic relations: a great emphasis was given to transatlantic ties. The Baltic states in particular, saw the presence of US in the area as vital in this sense due to their negative Soviet-era experience.
- Enlargement was the third distinct policy interest for the NMS with a high degree of heterogeneity.

These findings underline that NMS foreign policy interests are still clearly geographically confined. They tend to concentrate on relations with immediate neighbours or regions. In this sense, the two main geographic priorities are the EU eastern neighbours (Russia in particular) as well as the Western Balkans (especially for Slovenia and Hungary). The only exception in this case was represented by Afghanistan. The NMS justified their interest in the area as they saw in the achievement of this important global issue benefits for EU as a whole.

Finally, concerning the need to strengthen EU CFSP/CSDP, NMS showed a general preference for the institutional *status quo*, rather than major changes. They backed the inter-governmental mode of decision-making in CFSP while they seemed more hesitant about the need to work for institutional reform in foreign policy.

This suspicion was mainly due to:


- inadequate representation of the NMS in EU institutions;
- difficulties in communication between permanent

representations and national capitals due to technical and organizational deficiencies in exchanging classified data;

- an ongoing learning process in the functioning of EU institutions.

To conclude, NMS attitude towards Lisbon Treaty changes highlights that their foreign and security policy preferences are still shaped by the Cold War legacy, structural dependencies and by their geography. However, what is interesting is that while the Cold War legacy makes the NMS cling to NATO, at the same time NMS are more and more keen to enhance cooperation and integration in EU security policy.

Figure 9 What is currently more important to European security?



(Source: I. Krastev & M. Leonard, “European security: The spectre of a multipolar Europe”, European Council on Foreign Relations, London October 2010)

The best way to analyze this topic is to focus our attention on two countries, whose foreign policies attitudes are paradigmatic to understand the divergences between “Old” and “New Europe”. The former is represented by Poland, whereas the latter by Lithuania. In this sense, our aim will be that of showing the presence of an interesting shift from “Atlanticism” to a more “Communitarian” approach towards EU CFSP. This, in our opinion, is the key point to start a new discussion on the “European strategic culture” which has to take into considerations both Western and Eastern demands. This is, indeed, the only way to achieve a common “strategic culture” in the enlarged Europe.

POLISH STRATEGIC CULTURE: THE HISTORICAL LEGACY

The end of bipolar confrontation led to significant changes in Polish “strategic culture”. Poland had to find a balance between the West, mainly organized in NATO and the EU, and the East including former allies from the Warsaw Pact. This “in-between” situation, together with the fear of being isolated had a profound impact on foreign policy choices. Independent and transformed, Poland developed a new post-Cold War identity, which envisaged a new role for the country, as a regional leader, pre-destinated to promote democracy in the neighbourhood.³¹ In this strategy, accession to NATO and the EU were seen as two inseparable ways of achieving domestic security. A strong Europe was the best recipe for economic growth and security. Yet, Poles did not doubt that Europe needed a strong presence of the US, especially in the military sense.

Poland’s “strategic culture” is deeply rooted in its geopolitical history. Its position between Germany and Russia/Soviet Union

31 J.Kaminska, “New EU members and the CFSP: Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy”, *Political Perspectives* EPRU, 2007 Issue 2, no.2, pp. 1-24

was a major reason for its collapse in the late 18th century and again in 1939.³² This sense of inherent insecurity and vulnerability to external aggression, united with the uncertainty due to the unexpected collapse of Soviet Union, pushed Warsaw to apply for NATO membership as early as 1992. Therefore, at the core of Polish “strategic culture” lied the experience of a defeated nation, victim of *realpolitik*. Lessons learnt, combined with the dominant perception that USA were the best guarantor of security, determined the attractiveness of the Atlantic model. Moreover, Poland wanted to be treated equally and on par with others, thus it gave a strong focus on the principle of “collective security”.

Nevertheless, collective security was different from “multilateralism”. Since the end of World War II, Poland showed an ambivalent position towards multilateral security institutions. They were perceived with an amount of utilitarianism, not dissimilar from the US perspective. Multi-lateral Institutions were often charged of being ineffective in preventing conflicts. In this sense, history again heavily affected Polish approach to international law and the UN. For instance, during 1940s the founding of the UN raised hopes in the West for more orderly international relations. This view was undoubtedly lacking in Poland for one good reason. At the same time of the first UN plenary session in San Francisco, 16 high-ranking officers and politicians of the Polish anti-Hitler resistance, underground army (*Armia Krajowa*), including representatives of the Government in exile, were sentenced in Moscow for alleged collaboration with Nazi Germany.³³ In the 1990s Polish scepticism towards the primacy of international law and the UN was clearly demonstrated during the NATO operation in Kosovo. Unlike in Germany or France, a debate about the illegality of NATO action - which did not have a UN mandate - did not seriously emerge in Poland. It was simply assumed in Warsaw that although it would be better to act with a UN mandate, international law was less

32 M. Zaborowski, “Between Power and Weakness: Poland – A New Actor in the Transatlantic Security”, *Center for International Relations* Warsaw, August 2003

33 O. Osica “Poland: a New European Atlanticist at a crossroads?”, in *Old Europe New Europe and the Transatlantic Agenda*, by K. Longhurst and M. Zaborowski, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2005

important than preventing the spread of instability in the Balkans.³⁴

Therefore, historical burden is fundamental in order to understand Polish foreign policy in post-Cold War period as well as its “Atlanticism”. In this sense, Osica states that Polish Atlanticism was essentially a product of Poland’s traumatic national history (Osica 2005). The two countries shared a specific view of the world, according to which politics had to be value-driven, rather than looking for legal consent. Decisive - if necessary unilateral actions through the use of military force - sometimes were the only alternative left to Nation-States. We could sum this up by reporting a statement by the American Ambassador to Poland, Christopher R. Hill. He argued that:

‘the Poles and Americans have similar attitudes towards security and foreign policy in general, which is a consequence of our particular historical experiences.’

However, the sources of this concord are quite different for each of these two states. In the case of USA, they result from its power and in the case of Poland they are rooted in its relative weakness (Osica 2005). This meant that, unlike Western European states, Poland did not seek to constrain American hegemony, since it knew EC/EU was unable to provide it security. Therefore, they accepted this US-led international system, (after all the hegemonic country was not a nearby state) and they tried to use it to pursue their own foreign policy goals.

A NEW TRANSATLANTIC ACTOR?

As we have seen, since the early 1990s Poland has emerged as one of the US’s closest ally, arguably its “protégé” in CEE. It was clear that Poland, by virtue of its large population and geographical

³⁴ “Who Speaks for Europe?”, *The Economist*, February 2003, <http://www.economist.com/node/1563772>

location, was destined to be a key player in NATO, once accession was secured in the EU.

The first example of this strong link, was represented by war in Afghanistan 2001. In that occasion, Poland decided to deploy a contingent of 300 military troops. This small but highly symbolic military contribution demonstrated how determined Polish decision-makers and politicians were to prove Poland’s attempt to belong to the “inner circle” of US strong allies (Osica 2005). Moreover, Polish Government showed an unequivocal support both for the US Missile Defence (EPAA) program and for the Iraqi War. Once the war was over, a 2,500-strong Polish contingent took direct military control of a limited region in south central Iraq, albeit with some assistance from NATO’s SHAPE and financial support from Washington (Missiroli 2004). This support for the US war in Iraq was given despite domestic problems (economic recession and corruption scandals within the Government) and in the face of public opinion which was strongly divided with a slight majority being against participation in the war (in October 2003 57% against presence in Iraq and 37% for). Meanwhile, by 2004 EU started raising more enthusiasm than NATO. Interestingly, Osica underlines that *Transatlantic Trends* showed that people also started backing a more independent approach from Washington. On the other side, 77% of Polish interviewees – topping the EU chart – believed that Europe should acquire more military power to be able to protect its interests separately from the US, and 68% wanted a more powerful EU in order to cooperate more effectively with the US (Osica 2005).

POLAND EASTERN DIMENSION

Poland even tried to exploit this privileged relation with Washington to shape new EU foreign policy. Warsaw was aware that what could challenge its role as the “US’s protégé” in the East was a failure to effectively exercise its regional role. This was seen as an

extremely dangerous scenario since it could lead to a reassessment of America's involvement in the region.

The concept of an Eastern policy has been used constantly in Polish foreign policy discourse since 1989, but its contents evolved over time. Poland's ambition has always been that to promote democracy and economic development in Eastern Europe, while exporting the success of its own transformation process. Poland's interest in its Eastern neighbours was also strengthened by historical and cultural ties and considerable Polish minorities in Ukraine (approximately 400 000 – 700 000) and Belarus (almost 40,0 000).³⁵

Warsaw's eastern policies appeared quite distinct from those of its West European partners. In particular, Poland's policy towards the East was characterized by strong support for the newly independent States between itself and Russia. Poland was the major advocate of efforts to anchor Ukraine in the West; it supported the pro-independence movement in Belarus and promoted NATO's enlargement beyond its eastern borders (Missiroli 2004). Poland welcomed the ENP, although it soon underlined its limits. For instance, Warsaw emphasized the need for a specific EU Eastern policy and criticized the decision to lump all the neighbouring countries together under one common neighbourhood policy. Polish policy-makers argued that ENP did not differentiate enough the Southern and Eastern countries (Kaminska 2007). This critical approach raised some scepticism in Brussels, where Polish strategy was perceived as too narrowly focused on the promotion of the its own national interests.

Yet, Warsaw criticism was also directed against EU attempts to build a ESS. As Osica pointed out, Polish disappointment was due to the only marginal reference to Russia in the ESS paper of 2003. Russia has always been the litmus test for Polish public opinion and politicians of European foreign policy.³⁶

35 A.K. Cianciara, 'Eastern Partnership' – opening a new chapter of Polish East-ern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy?, *Analyses and Opinions, Institute of Public Affairs*, 2008 vol.4, pp.1-16

36 O. Osica "A Secure Poland in a Better Union? The ESS as Seen from Warsaw's Perspective", in "The European Security Strategy Paper Tiger Or Catalyst for Joint Action? Perspectives from Italy, Poland, Austria and Finland", *German foreign policy in dialogue*, 2005, vol.5, no. 14, p.13

Another important example of Polish dynamism in Eastern Europe, was represented by the EaP. Warsaw was afraid that the EU wanted to strengthen its co-operation and support of the southern dimension (Sarkozy's initiative for a *Mediterranean Union*). In this sense, Poland pursued a counterbalancing mechanism which could re-emphasize the importance of the eastern dimension. It criticized the unequal treatment of southern and eastern EU neighbours and actively tried to support its neighbours and partners, especially Ukraine and Georgia (Lapczynski 2009). Poland was indeed, particularly concerned about potential instability in its eastern neighbourhood – notably in Ukraine, Belarus or Russia. In this sense, the energetic crisis with Ukraine conveyed the message that Moscow could exploit CEECs energetic dependency for political gain. In this sense, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 exacerbated old fears.³⁷

CURRENT TRENDS: THE "EUROPEANIZATION" OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

Both ENP and EaP show that Poland has always considered EU integration as another pillar of its security. The country adapted well to the CFSP, especially concerning administrative and bureaucratic structures (Kaminka 2007). The main weakness was represented by political elites, due to the high fluctuation of cadres and the high level of politicization amongst the cadres. Therefore, support for EU cooperation waned at times, in particular during 2006-2007 when President Lech Kaczynski and his brother, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczynski, both from the *Law and Justice party*, led the country. Their euro-scepticism provoked some clashes, including delays in the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. The situation changed in 2007,

37 M. O'Donnell, "Poland's U-turn on European Defence: A Missed Opportunity?", *U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES*, March 2012, No. 53, pp.1-7

when Donald Tusk, the leader of *Civic Platform*, became prime minister. Since then, Poland tried to diversify its security guarantees. NATO was still considered a key pillar of national security. However, the lack of cohesion of NATO members during Georgian war, rose suspicions about the credibility of the alliance (O'Donnell 2012). Moreover, Warsaw was disappointed by the limited returns on its support for US-led military operations. The lack of contracts for Polish firms in Iraq, as well as US reluctance to allow Poles to enter the US without visas (Poland remains one of the few EU countries not covered by the US visa waiver program), raised a big domestic dissatisfaction. Furthermore "US-Russia reset", together with the abandonment by the Obama administration's of the "missile defence program" conveyed the idea that Washington was neglecting its CEE allies. Poland started wondering about US hidden goal of progressively withdrawing from European security projects. This mix of fears and suspicions pushed Warsaw to adopt a new strategy towards EU defence cooperation. This shift was not only the consequence of US detachment from EU. It actually belonged to a broader strategy which was based on the idea that the best way to serve Poland's interests was to become a central player in the EU and develop constructive ties with neighbours (O'Donnell 2012).

Poland proved to assimilate quickly the new changes in the EU CSDP. It was not an easy process but it produced some positive results. For instance, Polish soldiers actively participated in EU-led missions in regions such as Congo, which have never been spheres of Polish interest. Moreover, Warsaw contributed to the development of humanitarian aid to Africa or Asia, and also joined the process of building a European security capacity, by contributing with soldiers to multinational battle-groups.³⁸ Poland also sent experts for civilian missions, becoming the sixth largest contributor in the EU (Cianciara 2008). This led many analysts to introduce the idea of the "Europeanization" of Polish foreign policy. This transformation was particularly apparent in Polish relations with Asia-Pacific countries. Poland participated in Asia-Europe Meetings

38 R. Kupiecki, *Polish Security Policy 2004 in Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2005*. Akademia Dyplomatyczna MSZ, Warszawa: pp. 56-57, quoted in J.Kaminska, "New EU members and the CFSP: Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy", *Political Perspectives* EPRU 2007 Issue 2, no.2

and ASEM Regional Forum; Poland tried to play a more active role in EU external dimension, by giving financial support to Indonesia after the Tsunami, and also sent a Polish Medical Mission to Iran after the earthquake (Kupiecki, 2005).

The EU widened Polish national interest in Africa and Latin America. In this sense, Warsaw realized that only through an active policy in the EU Poland could achieve its Eastern policy goals. Furthermore, Warsaw proposed a variety of ways to reinvigorate the EU's defence efforts – from improving EU-NATO cooperation and making EU "battle-groups" easier to deploy, to increasing the participation of the EU's eastern neighbours in CSDP. Nevertheless, the lack of agreement on the need to give EU its own military Headquarters (mainly because of UK opposition) as well as the need to implement new reforms in the military sector to meet both EU and NATO requirements, made Polish initiatives fail. However, in November 2012 Poland, together with France, Germany, Italy and Spain called for a new strengthening of EU military capabilities. In fact, as Polish foreign minister Sikorski said: "If the EU wants to become a superpower, and Poland supports this, then we must have the capability to exert influence in our neighbourhood ... Sometimes we must use force to back our diplomacy"³⁹.


In the last three years, Poland has completely changed its approach to defence policy. Being one of the strongest allies of Washington, Warsaw shifted from a traditional mistrust towards EU security initiatives, to a much more constructive approach. In this sense it became one of the most vocal advocates of common European Union defence efforts. Poland realized that being a middle size State with big State aspirations, it had to follow the EU rules of behaviour to achieve its aims in the Eastern neighbourhood. Initial scepticism about the CFSP was replaced by a new faith in what was seen as a great instrument for achieving its goals and gaining influence in the EU. Finally, by becoming an "expert" on the Eastern European issues (mainly Belarus and Ukraine), Poland was also able to shape EU decisions on these issues.

39 A. Rettman, "Five EU countries call for new military 'structure', *EU Observer*, 16/11/2012, <http://euobserver.com/defence/118226>


AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW: TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2012

An interesting tool to underline Polish shift from “Atlanticism” to a much more “European” approach towards security is represented by both *Transatlantic Trends* and *Eurobarometer*. The 2012 Transatlantic Trend Report shows that while highest desirability rates for U.S. leadership were expressed in the Netherlands (65%), the U.K. (62%), and Germany (60%), the largest drop was experienced in Poland (down 11 percentage points to 38% from 2011) — matched by a 13 percentage-point rise of Poles who find U.S. leadership “undesirable”.

Strikingly interesting was the Polish position to the need to consider NATO as the main guarantor of security for Europe. Figures ranged from a high of 71% in the Netherlands and the UK, to a low of 45% in Poland (down by 19 points from 2002 and 6 points from the previous year). 40% Poles said that it is no longer essential, the second highest in Europe (after Spain). This coincides with an high negativity about past interventions. Asked if the Iraqi War was the right thing to do, 55% said it was not while only 26% said it was, the latter representing the lowest number in Europe.




Much the same held true when Poles were asked about Afghanistan (55% disapproved; 27% approved). The same extends to future interventions. Asked if Nations had the responsibility to protect civilians from violence committed by their Governments, 42% of Poles, the lowest number in Europe, said that they did; 35%, the highest number in Europe, said that they did not. This conviction was maintained for Syria, since 67% of Poles said that their country should not intervene in the conflict. Of those, 71% maintained their position even in the case of a hypothetical UN mandate. As we stated, interesting data emerged from the question about the exit strategy for Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the top six European NATO members supplying troops in Afghanistan all had majorities preferring complete withdrawal: Germany (51%), the UK (52%), Italy (55%), France (61%) and Poland (62%)⁴⁰.



Finally, the report shows that Polish citizens do not support force as a tool to solve international disputes as they did in the past. In this sense, only 4% of interviewed said they strongly support war

40 *Transatlantic Trends 2012: Topline Figures*, available at www.transatlantic-trends.org

(with a massive drop from 2002 when 18% agreed); 24% of Poles “agreed somewhat” to the use of war while 31% (24% in 2002) of them somewhat disagreed and finally 33% (a 13% increase from 2002) totally disagreed to use force as a way to achieve justice.



Meanwhile, a growing number of Polish support the strengthening of EU CFSP. In 2008 three-quarters of Poles (77%) proved to be in favour of a common foreign policy among the Member States towards other countries. On the other side, 81% of them expressed a strong support to the EU CSDP. Just 10% of Polish citizens were against it. The support for a common defence and security policy in Poland was higher than the EU27 average (75%). The EU CDSP was favoured mainly in Slovakia (91%), Cyprus (89%), Belgium, the Czech Republic (both 87%) and Slovenia (86%).⁴¹ If we look at *Eurobarometer no.80/2013*, the trends is confirmed. In fact, despite the European recession, 78% of Polish citizens are still in favour of a strengthened EU CSDP. The percentage of people against this project grew compared to the past (by reaching a level of 16%) but this can be related to the opposition towards military intervention in Syria, as well as to the lack of political coherence among EU member

⁴¹ EU Commission, *Eurobarometer 70 Public Opinion In The European Union: Executive Summary Poland*, Autumn 2008

States during Libyan military operations.⁴²

Question: What do you think about a EU common security and defence policy for all 27 member States?

%	EB 80.1	Diff. EB 79.3	Pour		Contre		NSP	
			For		Against		DK	
			Dafür		Dagegen		WN	
	EB 80.1	Diff. EB 79.3	EB 80.1	Diff. EB 79.3	EB 80.1	Diff. EB 79.3	EB 80.1	Diff. EB 79.3
EU28	73	-1	19	0	8	1		
BE	84	2	14	-2	2	0		
BG	81	-4	9	3	10	1		
CZ	80	1	16	-2	4	1		
DK	66	-4	29	2	5	2		
DE	82	3	14	-2	4	-1		
EE	84	-2	10	2	6	0		
IE	51	-2	35	1	14	1		
EL	73	-3	25	3	2	0		
ES	77	1	14	-1	9	0		
FR	77	-1	14	-2	9	3		
HR	82	1	14	0	4	-1		
IT	68	-4	20	0	12	4		
CY	81	2	14	-2	5	0		
LV	87	4	8	-1	5	-3		
LT	82	-2	7	0	11	2		
LU	84	-1	10	-1	6	2		
HU	71	-3	23	3	6	0		
MT	69	9	14	-4	17	-5		
NL	74	-1	24	2	2	-1		
AT	64	4	31	-2	5	-2		
PL	78	-4	16	5	6	-1		
PT	65	-1	23	0	12	1		
RO	77	-1	10	-1	13	2		
SI	79	2	16	-4	5	2		
SK	85	-1	12	2	3	-1		
FI	59	3	37	-3	4	0		
SE	59	1	38	-1	3	0		
UK	54	-2	32	-2	14	4		

⁴² EU Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 80: Tables of tables of results*, December 2013 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_anx_en.pdf

LITHUANIA: “THE GOLDEN PROVINCE OF EUROPE”

In 1994 after having obtained independence, gained world’s recognition, and made alien troops withdraw, Lithuania foreign policy sharply changed. Neutrality was replaced by the will to adhere to the Euro-Atlantic community. Accession to the EU (and NATO) were the two most important security priorities during the rest of the decade.⁴³

At the beginning of 2000s, Lopata identified 4 possible paths Lithuania could choose in foreign policy⁴⁴.

- Lithuania as both “stronghold” and “periphery” of the West. This implied rapid and legitimate integration with Western structures. Moreover, Vilnius had to work to push Western CIS countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and perhaps Moldova) to be geared to the West.
- Lithuania as a “bridge” between East and West, an overlapping area of both Eastern and Western structures. This would enable Lithuania to conduct active regional policy and possibly to transform the East, i.e. Russia itself.
- Lithuania as a “regional leader” thanks to a special relation with USA.
- Lithuania as the “golden province of Europe” which could play a key geopolitical role in the area being part of the Baltic Community, as well as the most Southern part of the Nordic Community and the most northern part of CEE.

Lithuania showed a great degree of ambition. In this sense, some politicians even dreamed to use Western support to sustain the so called *Gran Duchy of Lithuania vision*

43 R. Vilpišauskas, “The Dilemmas Of Transatlantic Relations After EU Enlargement And The Implications For Lithuania”, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2003 issue 11-12, available at www.ceeol.com

44 R. Lopata, “Recent Lithuanian Debates on Lithuania’s Foreign Policy”, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2009, issue 22, pp. 160-171, available at www.ceeol.com

THE “DUAL LOYALTY” OF LITHUANIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

In 2002 Lithuania was invited to join the EU and NATO. Since then, a new issue emerged in domestic political discourse. The so-called “dilemma of dual loyalty” was understood as the need to be able to pursue two conflicting goals: the first was to remain a reliable partner of the United States, while the second one was to remain committed to the process of European integration. This “dilemma” suggested several things about Lithuanian identity in the new Europe. On one hand, the use of the word “loyalty” reflected a postcolonial way of thinking in Lithuanian society. “Loyalty” suggested that there was a yearning to be committed to someone powerful. On the other hand, discussions about “dual loyalty” were an attempt by Vilnius to shift from a “policy-taker” to a “policy-maker” (R. Vilpišauskas 2009).

A popular myth claims that all the Baltic States always had a pro-American and anti-Russian mindset. This approach was applied to Lithuania as well. The common mantra of Lithuanian defence officials was indeed ‘no duplication’, which meant that the EU should not create new structures where NATO ones already existed.⁴⁵ In this sense, Vilnius relied on the US-led NATO Alliance as its primary security guarantor. Meanwhile, it showed a little support to CFSP and even tried to obstruct its development, serving as US “Trojan horse” in Europe. This myth was reinforced by the war in Iraq, which gave rise to heated debate about the division between “Old” and “New” Europe. This oversimplified narrative is wrong. The EU and NATO have always been two sides of the same coin. Membership in the EU represented political, cultural and ideational “coming back” to Europe, as well as the symbol of the pursuit of economic and social prosperity. On the other hand, membership in NATO was seen as the most efficient “hard” security guarantee against perceived military threats (mainly from Russia). However, the “tectonic shift” represented by Euroatlantic clashes on Iraq, was seen as a nightmare in Vilnius. Furthermore, the attempt by both bigger EU member

45 K. Brummer *The North and ESDP The Baltic States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden* Gütersloh, June 2007

States and the US to build anti-terrorist strong co-operation with Russia, risked to jeopardize its vital security interests. Bush visit in Vilnius in 2002 was not enough to calm down tensions in the country.

As with Poland, also Lithuanian “Atlanticism” had historical reasons. Like many CEECs, Lithuania suffers from a historical “victim’s syndrome”. This always pushed it to invite a friendly power (in this case the USA) to provide balance against Russia. After all, USA had already proved to be a reliable partner in the past. For instance, during Soviet times the United States did not recognize *de jure* the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. Moreover, in 1993 USA helped to negotiate the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Lithuania and supported its accession in the European Union and, after 9/11, to NATO. Unlike the US, France and Germany were perceived as “pro-Russians”. For this reason, France-Germany and Russia trilateral meeting in St. Petersburg was presented by political propaganda in a similar way as Munich Conference or Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. This was one of the reasons why Lithuania supported the Iraqi War. It was also one of the supporters of the “Vilnius 10 Declaration” in 2003. However, the decision to back US military intervention in Iraq, was not perceived as an “anti-European” one. It was actually based on rational calculation: support to US in the Middle East would have been exchanged with US help in times of troubles (Lopata 2009).

Despite of public rhetoric, Lithuania’s alleged “pro-Americanism” never went far beyond “hard security issues” and relations with Russia. A part from moral support, there was little Washington could offer it in other areas of crucial importance, such as the economic and social development. In addition to that, Lithuania has never played any particular strategic importance in terms of war on terrorism. Meanwhile, the impact of the EU in ordinary life has rocketed since accession. Vilnius tried to synchronize its schedule with that of the EU Institutions. People started supporting the EU CFSP, with higher support than the EU average level (71% for compared to EU average level of 69%; meanwhile 6% were against it versus a EU level of 20%)⁴⁶. Nevertheless, support to EU CFSP was always controversial.

46 EU Commission, *Eurobarometer 62 “Public Opinion in the EU”*, May 2005, p.121

Firstly, Vilnius cautious approach was partly due to the exclusion of Baltic interests and ideas in the forming of CFSP. Lithuania was not EU member in 1999 when the ESDP was launched and when it joined the EU in 2004, the Old member States had already formed their interests regarding this new policy. These ones were quite far from Baltic needs and capabilities. Furthermore, the introduction of the *ESS* in 2003 did not cover all security interests and understanding of mutual obligations in security provision.⁴⁷ EU CFSP created big dilemmas for Vilnius. In particular, there was the fear that a group of large member States, potentially joined by a group of mostly federalist-minded EU countries, could make decisions without regarding the interests of others. In this sense, the decision by the European Commission to modify the *acquis communautaire* in order to accommodate the interests of Russian authorities on Kaliningrad raised many suspicions.

Therefore, when it came to CFSP cohesiveness, Lithuania never seemed to share public statements. For instance, until 2005, Lithuania contributed with just 2 officers in ESDP operations in Bosnia, and FYROM while no officer was sent to the operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Paulauskas 2006). On the other side, country’s leaders strongly welcomed the idea of establishing NATO (or, as Linkevičius put it, “*American* or NATO”) military bases or training facilities on Lithuanian territory. Vilnius contributed with troops to NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania, and supported America’s “war on terror.” In 2002–2003, 79 troops were deployed in Afghanistan, while 120 troops remained in Iraq even after the withdrawal of Spanish troops (Budryté 2005). For this reason, Lithuania could not agree with all those initiatives aimed at strengthening EU military capacities at NATO expenses. In this context, the *intergovernmental* system of decision-making was still perceived as the best guarantee of both national security and political independence. Another element which undermined Vilnius credibility, was the fact that many times it proved to be a “one issue country”. In other words, while Lithuanian representatives who were very active in the Council meetings when relations with Russia

47 Kasekamp & V. Veebel. “Overcoming doubts: The Baltic states and the European Security and Defence Policy”. This article was a revised one in Klaus Brummer, *The North and CSDP*, Gütersloh Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007

were under discussion, they tended to be more passive during other discussions.

Yet, from 2007 Lithuanian attitude towards EU CFSP sharply changed. Country's policy makers realized that, while a strong CFSP would not kill transatlantic relations, on the other hand, a weak CFSP would seriously undermine its security interests *vis-à-vis* Russia. In this sense, we share Archer's view that EU CFSP could act as a link with Russia rather than being divisive, since it could even pave the way for Moscow to join some EU-led military operations.⁴⁸ Since 1991 (when the country did not have any military equipment or even military uniforms), progress made was remarkable. Moreover, a big target was achieved in 2008, when Lithuania decided to abandon "conscription" by focusing on the creation of a new Army made up only by professionals. Meanwhile, Lithuania's contribution in EU-led external missions increased fivefold in three years- Lithuania had 60 men on missions in 2004, but already over 300 men by the beginning of 2007 (Kasekamp & Veebel 2007). Nevertheless, it is obvious that being so small, the country could not (and cannot) be represented in every EU-led mission and activity. Thus, it should continue to focus on developing niche capabilities like mine-clearing, medical support and border-management. However, what is needed is that old member States better appreciated that Lithuania, as well as all Baltic states did not have the same 50 years "peace and prosperity" experience as Western Europe. In this sense, Lithuania needs time to overcome traditional threats from Russia. Therefore, the next step for fruitful cooperation could be that old member States start to reflect more Baltic interests in the next ESS and thus a common security strategy will become common also in practice (Kasekamp & Veebel 2007).

48 C. Archer, *The CSDP and the Nordic and Baltic States*, Lithuanian Military Academy, 2006

VILNIUS ACTIVISM IN THE EAST

Since 2004 Vilnius also started asserting a new active role in regional affairs. It wanted to become a center of "interregional collaboration" which "could unite cultures and civilizations". Lithuania's aim was to disseminate security and stability, by promoting the expansion of democratic structures beyond its borders. The expansion of democracy in the East was indeed complementary to increase Lithuania's reliability in the democratic world. It tried to use the expertise, knowledge and credibility it had acquired during the transition process to start a more pro-active foreign policy.⁴⁹ After all, it shared the same past as Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus as former Soviet satellites. In this sense, the Soviet past was seen as having contributed to Lithuania's ability to help westerners communicate with the post-communist East.⁵⁰ Therefore, the country was actively involved in collective Euro-Atlantic structures while strongly supported both EU and NATO enlargement policies. However, this "double track" was not like "frying eggs from two eggs"; NATO was not a security guarantee, and the EU was not like patching holes (R. Vilpišauskas 2003).

The death of the Lithuanian State security officer V. Pociūnas in Belarus in 2006, deeply affected the country's foreign policy decisions on the Eastern dimension. The active regional policy Lithuania had been conducting in the East since spring 2004 started to raise doubts. Lithuania had always been a strong supporter of ENP and this pushed some analysts to claim that this initiative could create a rift between the country and Western Europe. Many authors even argued that Eastern Europe did not belong to Western civilization, thus it was extremely problematic to achieve the democratic development of this area in the short-term. Moreover, Vilnius pursuit of effective

49 K. Paulaskas, "Baltics from Nation States to member States", *Occasional Papers*, EU Institute for Strategic studies, Brussels, February 2006, no.62, pp. 1-47

50 D. Budrytė, "Lithuania's new (in)security: transatlantic tensions and the dilemma of dual loyalty", in *The Baltic States And Their Region New Europe Or Old?*, edited by D. J. Smith, Amsterdam-New York, 2005

mechanisms to influence Russia came under attack. It was indeed vital for the country not to undermine relations with Moscow, too. The only possible strategy was to withdraw from active regional policy altogether and maintain pragmatic relations with Russia. After all, Lithuania, as all the Baltic States was too small to be influential in the region. Therefore, it was necessary to find regional allies such as the Nordic Dimension or other CEECs (mainly Poland). Their attempt to “specialize” in one peculiar region was interpreted as a good strategy in Vilnius. Poland focused on Ukraine, Lithuania on Belarus while Estonia and Latvia concentrated on Southern Caucasus. Yet, it was clear that their efforts had to be complementary to those of EU Institutions.

NEED FOR “COMMUNITIZING EU CFSP”

Despite propagandistic claims, the Lithuanian “Euro-atlantic dilemma” is not as dramatic as one might think. It is true that the country does not share the enthusiasm that the EU needs to play a greater role in the global arena as a security actor. It is also true that Vilnius is more concerned about regional questions like energy security and prevention of border-crises rather than global ones. Finally, it is also obvious that if left alone to choose between NATO and EU CSDP, the Government will tend to prioritize NATO. The preservation of the “transatlantic link” will likely remain the guiding principle and daily mantra for Lithuania. Unfortunately, some EU core countries view this as an absence of loyalty, instead of trying to put more effort in order to solve this dilemma. Yet, the transatlantic relations are not about being pro-American or pro-European but about surviving. Maybe if EU CFSP/CSDP were much more effective Vilnius could pragmatically decide to reshape its “strategic culture”.

Nevertheless, this alleged Atlanticism will not reduce Vilnius commitment in the strengthening of EU military capacities. However, Lithuania still has two big concerns about the future of EU






























CFSP. Firstly, it fears that EU military standards will be different than NATO ones (implying an expensive and useless duplication of civil and military bodies). The second concern deals with the future of European Defence Agency (EDA). Lithuanian’s major military partner has always been represented by the USA. Vilnius thus hopes that EU armaments policies would be based not only on competition, but rather on fruitful and pragmatic cooperation with Washington.

In any case, it is not true that Lithuanians are totally sceptic about the real possibility for EU to strengthen both CFSP and CSDP. In this sense, *Eurobarometer 80 2013*⁵¹ shows the need for a more “communitized” policy-making model. Despite having originally supported the intergovernmental model for CFSP, Lithuania has recently adjusted its approach and is now a strong supporter of the communitarian method. Therefore, although many past misunderstandings, the level of support for EU CFSP grew from 52% to 74% between 2004 and 2013,⁵² while only 12% of population opposed it. This means not only that the vast majority of Lithuanians approve the EU common foreign and security policies. What is striking is that, despite being traditionally “pro-USA” Lithuania performed better than many other EU member States. In fact, the EU average level of support for EU CFSP was just 63% while 27% of Europeans on average do not welcome the strengthening of EU CFSP. This trend was confirmed for EU CSDP. Despite a slight decrease from 2008 to 2012, Vilnius performance is still higher than the EU average. 82% of Lithuanians support EU CSDP (compared to 86% in 2010), while only 7% of them oppose the initiative (the level was 4% in 2010). Therefore, despite economic crisis and cuttings in defence budgets, the level of public support to EU CSDP is still much higher than the EU average (73%).

51 EU Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 80: Tables of results*, December 2013 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_anx_en.pdf

52 EU Commission, *Eurobarometer 62 Public Opinion In The European Union National Report Executive Summary Lithuania*, Autumn 2004

Question: What do you think about a EU common security and defence policy for all 27 member States?

%		Pour		Contre		NSP	
		For		Against		DK	
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	EE	84	-2	10	2	6	0
	IE	51	-2	35	1	14	1
	EL	73	-3	25	3	2	0
	ES	77	1	14	-1	9	0
	FR	77	-1	14	-2	9	3
	HR	82	1	14	0	4	-1
	IT	68	-4	20	0	12	4
	CY	81	2	14	-2	5	0
	LV	87	4	8	-1	5	-3
	LT	82	-2	7	0	11	2
	LU	84	-1	10	-1	6	2
	HU	71	-3	23	3	6	0
	MT	69	9	14	-4	17	-5
	NL	74	-1	24	2	2	-1
	AT	64	4	31	-2	5	-2
	PL	78	-4	16	5	6	-1
	PT	65	-1	23	0	12	1
	RO	77	-1	10	-1	13	2
	SI	79	2	16	-4	5	2
	SK	85	-1	12	2	3	-1
	FI	59	3	37	-3	4	0
	SE	59	1	38	-1	3	0
	UK	54	-2	32	-2	14	4

CONCLUSIONS

In the last years, a pressing call for renewing or maybe “reinventing” the European “strategic culture” has emerged within the academic debate. The growing number and variety of overseas operations and missions undertaken within the context of the EU’s CSDP, suggests a new seriousness about the EU’s role in security matters and also the need for its acceptance.⁵³ These EU-led operations, although limited, feed the discourse, creating a sense of legitimacy and even pressure on further operations.

The ESS of 2003, which set out a vision for the EU as a global actor, provides a useful starting point. It pointed five “key threats” to Europe- terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and consequent regional instability, and organized crime — against which Europe needed “both to think globally and act locally”.⁵⁴ However, the ESS had an original sin. It did not involve the new member States. This created a sense of suspicion within the Continent, which seriously undermined EU cohesion and impeded Brussels to present itself as a reliable security actor in the region. For most of CEECs the enlargement process was a two-fold mechanism, which implied joining both EU and NATO and which led to criticism coming from Old members. However, in the last years, the commitment of CEECs to the strengthening of EU CSDP has been more than evident. Since the “Berlin Plus Agreements” were launched, CEE contribution to EU CFSP/CSDP proved to be paradoxically much more flexible than that of Old member States. CEECs were more willing than old ones to radically reform their military sectors especially through specialization, the complementation of other countries’ armed forces, and joint acquisitions. Precisely, in this paper we saw that,

53 G. Edwards: “Is there a strategic culture in the enlarged European Union?”, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 2006, vol.41, no.3, pp.7-23

54 European Union (2003). ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy’. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

despite structural problems both Poland and Lithuania showed an increased willingness to make EU external action more effective. Both *Eurobarometers* and *Transatlantic Trends* show that both elites and public opinion are more and more supporting EU CFSP/CSDP. This is complementary to their ambitions in Eastern Europe, but there is no doubt that these countries contributed to EU-led operations. Therefore, the enlargement process radically changed the EU also in security terms.

Nonetheless, after Kosovo crisis in 2008, a new-old risk emerged in Eastern Europe: the threat of “mini-lateralism”.⁵⁵ EU plays a crucial role in some mini-lateral fora such as G8, the “Contact Group” for the Balkans, the “Quartet” for the Middle East or the “5+1 Group” for Iran. Yet, Brussels must use its internal holistic mechanisms, in order to transform them into vehicles for achieving effective multilateral solutions, not just more visibility and clout. This process of growing international legitimization is not, however, uncontested. National claims as well as political and budgetary constraints remain the main obstacle for carrying out ambitious projects both within and outside the EU. Moreover, another extremely complicated constrain is the need to find a way to preserve transatlantic relations and to be a new, different and strong actor in the international arena.

However, the institutionalization of the CSDP created the conditions for the evolution of European strategic culture. Now, the redefinition of the ESS cannot be delayed anymore.⁵⁶ Both the 2003 ESS and its updated version from 2008 are clearly outdated. They were always too vague while they did not connect threats, goals and means. Meanwhile, a plethora of documents stressing the need for an enhanced EU security have been published, by increasing confusion within the Institutions. Therefore, a new ESS should set up a clear hierarchy of all these documents. This would indeed be the first step to assess both old and new threats the member States are facing. In addition, it would give EU institutions the right tools to implement its strategies. EU has extraordinarily changed since 2003.

55 A. Missiroli “Revisiting The European Security Strategy – Beyond 2008”, *Policy Brief*, April 2008, European Policy Center

56 J. J. Andersson, E. Brattberg, M. Häggqvist, H. Ojanen, M. Rhinard, “The European Security Strategy: Reinvalidate, Revise or Reinvent?”, *UI Occasional Papers*, 2011, The Swedish Institute for International Affairs, no.7, pp.1-42

The “enlargement process” brought new cultures, experiences and attitudes towards security issues. Therefore, the starting point for any discussion, is to realize that EU must listen to everybody needs and priorities. This is the only way to build a new more democratic and consensual decision-making system.

The international context has dramatically changed since 2003. There’s a serious risk to shift from a multilateral to a multi-polar world ruled by the traditional system of “balance of powers”.⁵⁷ Both economic and financial crises risk to make new ESS a less ambitious project. However, economic troubles cannot be an excuse. Austerity paradoxically provides a unique chance to increase the level of coherence within EU, through a stronger sharing of expertise and specializations in specific sectors.⁵⁸

To conclude, despite internal divisions, EU managed to create a peaceful “holistic approach” towards the implementation of CSFP/CSDP.⁵⁹ What it needs now is to make this multilateral system more effective than in past. EU has only one pace to choose: creating a “concert of projects” as well as a new net of international relations based on mutual trust and shared goals.⁶⁰ It will not be possible to reinvigorate the debate about EU “strategic culture”, by excluding NMS, again. Only by including them, the EU common security strategy will become common also in practice.

57 M. Drent & L. Landman, “Why EU needs a new ESS?”, *Clingendael Policy Brief*, July 2012, The Clingendael Institute, no.9, pp. 1-6

58 J. Howorth, “The EU as a global actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2010, vol.48, no.3, pp. 455-474

59 K. Zwolski, “The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: finally a green light for an holistic approach?”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2012, vol.47, no. 1, pp. 68-87

60 I. Krastev & M. Leonard, “European security: The spectre of a multipolar Europe”, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, London October 2010



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